By the end of November 1941, military decoding experts in the U.S. had broken Japan’s secret codes and intercepted communications that a Japanese attack was imminent — and that there was a good possibility the attack would occur at Pearl Harbor. But such vital intelligence was not conveyed to Adm. Husband Kimmel, the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, and to the Army commanding general, Walter C. Short; they were in charge of Pearl Harbor’s defense.
On Dec. 7, “a day that will live in infamy,” Isoruku Yamamoto launched an air attack on Pearl Harbor, where America’s Pacific Fleet was based, that sank or damaged eight battleships, seven other vessels, and 188 airplanes, killing or wounding 3,435 American military personnel — with minimal cost to the attackers. America was now at war with Japan, and three days later, also was at war with Germany and Italy, Japan’s Axis allies.
In a well-written, thoroughly researched book, “A Matter of Honor,” Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan conclude convincingly that Kimmel and Short were made scapegoats for what happened. They were accused of ignoring intelligence information that was shared with them when, in fact, top officials in Washington, D.C., had failed to share this vital information. Throughout 1941, Navy headquarters was unresponsive to Kimmel’s repeated requests for additional reconnaissance planes and crew that could have increased the likelihood of detecting Japanese planes approaching Hawaii.
The authors also cite........