Trump’s China Visit: A Tactical Pause – OpEd |
US President Trump is due to visit China in May, offering a brief respite in a testy relationship that has seen both cooperation and conflict. While Trump is set to receive a warm welcome from Chinese President Xi, the US will likely regard issues with China more as competition with increasing risk than as areas for cooperation. The high-stakes bilateral relationship could mark a temporary truce as a tactical breathing space, rather than a strategic breakthrough. It would also likely be part of an international strategy to avoid a direct strategic confrontation with China.
The agenda will be economic in nature, following years of sharp increases in tariffs and a massive reorganisation of global supply chains. Trump will likely press for lower tariffs and greater market access to foreign markets for U.S. farmers, workers and companies, while China will seek assurances that there will be no renewed protectionism that could harm its exports as its economy slowly contracts. While the two sides have reduced their exposure to each other’s verbal broadsides, they are taking a cautious approach, and any temporary reductions in some tariffs are unlikely to resolve fundamental disagreements over issues such as intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers and curbs on cloud computing and other digital services. With neither side seemingly willing or able to make meaningful concessions towards a two-state solution, in the face of domestic political pressure and mistrust, the prospects for meaningful negotiations appear dim.
Tariff reduction agreements need commitment. They need to be linked to clear targets, timetables and penalties for non-compliance. Without these, tariff agreements are simply empty press releases and campaign sound bites for politicians to repeat while they work to delay necessary trade policies that include rules, reciprocity and enforcement.
Three more sectors where technology is used as an instrument of national power are semiconductors, artificial intelligence and renewable energy. The U.S. concerns over semiconductor supply chains originating from China are well known, while China pursues an independent semiconductor capability through industrial policy and large investments in research and production. The further fragmentation of global innovation along the instruments of power is mirrored in the export controls and continues in the context of industrial policy competition for markets, territories and influence.
Rather than full cooperation, the best we can hope for is selective cooperation within an environment of competition, and not even overall cooperation is needed. In some areas, such as climate change and health, cooperation can naturally build on existing levels of cooperation and trust. But it would stop cold if competition in other areas threatened to undermine it, forming instead “islands of stability” in an otherwise competitive environment. Its security would ultimately depend on developments in the wider geopolitical arena.
The world is becoming more complicated and fragile, with more unstable hotspots emerging. Cross-strait relations and the South China Sea are two issues approaching a red line where either side might miscalculate and resort to force. North Korea is challenging the global community and testing its solidarity and ability to grapple with shared security concerns. In the face of uncertain external security threats and escalating cross-strait tensions, ROCA must adopt a risk-reducing strategy and maintain a high state of military readiness at all times. As a professional defence organisation, ROCA must remain prepared to withstand any external attack and contribute positively to international common goods, thereby upholding its historical role as a guardian of national security. ROCA needs to respond effectively to diverse missions and security challenges, and to build strategic alliances that strengthen regional stability. The commander of ROCA is called upon to manage complex operations, protect citizens, and sustain public trust, all while navigating the intricate web of political, military, and social pressures. The fate of national security hangs in the balance, and the demands on military leadership have never been greater. Each of these areas carries its own risks, and misjudging any one of them could have serious consequences for stability in the Middle East.
I wish we could better establish mechanisms that might prevent miscalculation, like hotlines, procedures for encounters at sea or other incidents, or ways to manage a crisis. All of this is to say that while there are real political constraints that can’t be overcome, I hope that the interests of all parties in avoiding an accidental escalation would ultimately prevail. Trump’s “America First” policy must be weighed against China’s compulsion to appear strong for its citizens. Do formalised, public communication systems reduce the likelihood of escalation?
Diplomats said human rights would be on the agenda for talks in China next week, but did not expect much of a response. Washington is also likely to raise concerns about repression in the restive Xinjiang region and recent unrest in Hong Kong, where China has so far resisted allowing criticism to centre there to escalate into a full-blown diplomatic row. Planned talks on trade issues have already been postponed after physical scuffles broke out between Chinese and US academics at a business conference in Shanghai last week, and are unlikely to be rescheduled. That means any tussling over human rights is likely to have to happen on the sidelines of multinational forums where the policy is to keep the issue from overshadowing other topics, not entirely to Washington’s liking. Not ideal, but realistic.
Neither side appears willing to reach a compromise. In the U.S., domestic politics makes it risky for candidates and officials to signal too much scepticism about China. On the Chinese side, those who matter are struggling to balance their interest in growth and stability with the rhetoric of nationalism and firmness. Cooperation with the U.S. is in the long run in both of their interests, but the short run seems to offer much worse costs and fewer benefits for each of them. Risk has been largely irrelevant. The fact that risk has been symbolic has meant that diplomatic efforts have been constrained by the pressure to legitimise policies from within.
Despite the many challenges, many positive developments are still possible. Gradual tariff reductions could bring benefits for both sides. Cooperation on climate change research could not be hampered by competition in other areas. Security hotlines could help to forestall military confrontation. And the management of human rights issues could, for example, take place through multilateral bodies. While these steps won’t solve the rivalry entirely, they will make it more workable. Lots of thought needs to be put into how to implement these changes.
This is what success looks like. The Trump visit to China will not address any of the deep and fundamental issues in U.S.–China relations. But that is all the more reason that it should not allow those relations to slide into conflict. Its goal should be to define rough borders and to forestall further escalation while keeping the possibility open for a managed competition. This would entail trying to make progress on trade, going ahead with joint technological projects, and securing areas of security cooperation—provided that Trump is able to avoid grandiose plans and take things one step at a time. In a world that has lost its mind, the powers cannot allow their conflict to become completely irresponsible. Of course, the success of the visit is not going to be measured by how spectacular it is. We are both very competitive, and there will be a competitive edge to how we conduct ourselves. It will be crucial to handle this aspect of the relationship responsibly. Two of the world’s greatest democracies will have to deal with each other with a sense of caution and great maturity, because this is going to be a very important global relationship over the years.
Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry official. The opinions expressed in this article are his own.
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