Indonesia’s foreign policy has taken a more assertive and dynamic turn under the stewardship of President Prabowo Sugianto. While the bebas aktif ideology remains the guiding force behind Indonesia’s actions on the global stage, the former general’s interpretation of the concept is more practical, flexible, and nationalistic in its orientation. Prabowo’s foreign policy is more visible, more ambitious, and certainly more unpredictable than what the country has experienced under his predecessors. Whether this newly acquired global prominence can translate into genuine ascendancy, or whether it will bring greater risks to the archipelago, depends on the quality of the strategies and tactics that Prabowo and his team conjure up.

From the early days of his presidency, Prabowo was determined to ensure that Indonesia was no longer simply a spectator in global affairs. His diplomatic journeys to China, the US, Russia, Turkey and Egypt signalled to the world that, under his leadership, Indonesia would be a major player that superpowers cannot afford to ignore.

In terms of foreign policy, Prabowo is keen to make sure that it could help expedite investment, industrialization and the downstreaming of natural resources. For this to be meaningful, however, Indonesia’s vast supplies of nickel, bauxite and rare earths will need to be courted by investors from old industrial powers as well as from emerging ones. In line with Prabowo’s economic nationalism, he is not interested in simply exporting raw and semi-processed materials for others to manufacture into finished goods. Rather, he wants to cultivate foreign investment to develop industries in which Indonesia has a competitive edge. Part of the diplomacy will be to seek out technology transfers and aid for critical infrastructure such as ports and energy systems, as well as to pursue a wider and more geographically balanced array of trade relationships. Although Prabowo is known for his energetic approach to foreign policy, his haphazard approach may produce a foreign policy that is incoherent and lacks a long-term strategy.

Prabowo’s stance on non-alignment has been to move from a traditional single-minded stance towards a multi-alignment policy. As the world’s new “non-aligned movement” unfolds, with some predicting a new cold war between China and the US, Jakarta is busy lining its pockets on both sides of the divide. Foregrounding his economic development agenda during his presidential campaign, the former general recently visited Beijing, where he consolidated a crucial economic relationship between Indonesia and China, in sectors as diverse as energy and infrastructure. Meanwhile, he has begun to reach out to the US, which many observers interpret as Indonesia not taking sides in what is rapidly emerging as a global rivalry.

This multi-alignment is not limited to superpowers. Prabowo’s move to congratulate Indonesia’s integration into BRICS in 2025, as the most ideal year for its expansion to include emerging economies, reflects his desire to align with the new powers that increasingly shape the governance of the global financial architecture. Indonesia’s increasingly stronger relations with several Middle Eastern countries also reveal Prabowo’s efforts to forge new connections for Indonesia in its journey to becoming more than “a hundred friends” but “a thousand friends” at the same time, as Indonesia aims to reduce its vulnerability amid the increasingly complex global landscape. The challenges, however, begin when Indonesia faces the task of balancing various expectations from these numerous partners.

Prabowo’s worldview is also set to shape Indonesia’s foreign policy. The former military commander prioritises defence modernisation and security activism and sees the world through a ‘realist’ lens. This is reflected in his repeated calls for the country to strengthen its military, and to resist pressure from the international community to remain neutral on issues which are seen as core to national sovereignty. At the same time, Prabowo is a nationalist who proudly draws on anti-colonial rhetoric and wants Indonesia to remain independent of foreign influence. The resultant foreign policy is likely to be assertive and insistent on national sovereignty, yet also wary of externally generated pressure.

Prabowo has taken an unconventional stance on the Middle East in recent times. At the UN General Assembly, he caused a stir by prioritising the security of Israel ahead of peace for the people of Gaza, a position that will not sit well with most Indonesians, given the country’s long-standing solidarity with the Palestinian people. That he accepted Donald Trump’s offer to serve on the Board of Peace, established to promote peace in the Middle East, will only fuel further concern in Jakarta. The deployment of Indonesian troops to Gaza as part of the International Stabilisation Force under a UN mandate is seen as a further expansion of Jakarta’s global security role, one that will likely face criticism at home.

Prabowo’s foreign policy appears vibrant and robust, yet there are significant constraints to implementing it. The diplomatic apparatus of the Indonesian government is stretched to the limit and is hard-pressed to respond simultaneously to events in various regions. The country’s defence modernisation efforts are being impeded by insufficient funding and a lack of advanced technology and materials. The implementation of foreign policy is not isolated from the tumultuous domestic politics, and decisions on issues with strategic and security implications can easily create controversy. The joint statement issued by Prabowo and Chinese state leader Li Qiang in late 2024 on maritime affairs has already sparked public concern on the issue of the South China Sea. It shows that the government lacks a concrete foreign policy.

Indonesia’s foreign policy under Prabowo is a bold experiment. This shift seeks to elevate Indonesia’s profile and posture abroad, broadening the scope of relationships to incorporate newly emerging stakeholders, while also maximising economic returns to Indonesia’s vast domestic market. Yet, in shifting gears and trajectory, Prabowo may also inadvertently drive ‘overreach’, sow strategic ambiguity or incubate powerful domestic pushback. The key to unlocking potential rather than unlocking chaos will lie in Prabowo successfully translating his frenetic engagement into a cohesive long-term strategy that maintains Indonesian autonomy even as he strives to elevate its global standing. There are great rewards to be gained, in terms of an ever more assertive and confident Indonesia on the international stage, and indeed within the Indo-Pacific region, but also immense risks. The world is watching closely, as is the Indonesian public, to see what emerges as the foreign policy record of the Prabowo era.

Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian diplomat. His views are his own.

Joshua, Norman. (2026, February 18). The limits of Indonesia’s resilience diplomacy. East Asia Forum

M.Umar, Ahmad Rizky (2026, February 12). Indonesia’s multi-alignment dilemma under Prabowo. Lowy Institute for International Policy

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