Comparative political theorists and historians occasionally describe the early Ming dynasty (1368-1644) as one of the least intrusive periods of governance in Chinese history since the Han. Tax burdens were relatively light, bureaucratic penetration into village life was shallow, and much social regulation was left to families and local elites. These features have led some observers to characterize early Ming rule as “restrained,” or even proto-liberal, especially when contrasted with the later fiscal and administrative expansion of the Ming state.

This interpretation, however, confuses state weakness with ideological restraint. A closer examination of early Ming governance reveals not a principled commitment to limited rule, but the temporary incapacity of a post-collapse regime whose coercive authority remained absolute in theory, even when constrained in practice. Far from undermining a Rothbardian theory of state growth, the early Ming case confirms it: states govern lightly when they must, not when they believe they should.

To show this, let us first look at the empirical observations underlying the “early Ming restraint” thesis, which are largely correct. In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the Ming state:

In these respects, early Ming governance resembles the early Han period, particularly before Emperor Wu’s expansion of fiscal and military capacity—culminating eventually in the vast examination-based bureaucracy of the Song (960–1279). As with the Han, later Ming rulers dramatically increased taxation, monetization, and bureaucratic penetration as population recovered and administrative techniques improved.

The reason for this is clear enough: the early Ming state emerged from catastrophe. The collapse of the Yuan dynasty left China demographically depleted, economically dislocated, and administratively fractured. Transport infrastructure was damaged, local records were unreliable, and revenue........

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