After the USSR dissolution in 1991, the Russian leadership recognized the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all five Central Asian countries, each of which had previously had the status of a full Soviet Socialist Republic. Yet, they continued viewing them as remaining within Moscow’s orbit, as part of what President Vladimir Putin later declared Russia’s ‘zone of privileged interest’.
Particularly tough was and partly still is their grip on Kazakhstan. Once the Kazakh land was used by Russia as a base to invade the rest of Central Asia, now the Russian leaders see Kazakhstan as the foothold they need to have to sustain the other four countries of the region under their control.
Such is the force of inertia. From the traditional Russian point of view, the notion of ‘Central Asia’ actually doesn’t cover Kazakhstan, or even if it does, just partly. Such an understanding provides a framework for practical policies and strategies. During the Soviet period, Moscow always referred to the region as ‘Central Asia and Kazakhstan’. After the USSR dissolved, some Russian statesmen and politicians began to propagate a scornful attitude toward Kazakhstan, positioning it as a kind of docile client state of Russia.
Continuing to treat Kazakhstan the way presented above, Russian political elites seem to have decided that the Central Asian Republic, along with Belarus and Ukraine, should somehow be brought back under Moscow’s control.
In February 2003, the Kremlin initiated a process of creating a single economic space (CES) consisting of Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation to translate that concept into........