Opinion – Multipolarity and the End of Nuclear Stability |
Going back to the core motive behind U.S. military campaigns against Iran—intensifying from 2025 into full-scale war in 2026—and, more broadly, to the enduring regional confrontations involving Israel, the central objective has been to prevent nuclear proliferation, as a nuclear Iran would emerge as a dominant regional power, threaten U.S. allies, and exert control over critical energy routes, thereby undermining the regional balance of power. In 2012, Kenneth Waltz argued that “more may be better,” suggesting that a nuclear Iran could, in fact, enhance regional stability by restoring the balance of power, counterbalancing Israel’s nuclear monopoly, keeping conflicts limited below the threshold of escalation, and inducing greater strategic caution. In this view, nuclearization could ultimately accomplish Iran’s security imperatives, reducing incentives for revisionist behavior. Can the same argument still be made – and could Iranian nuclear proliferation contribute to stabilizing the region by addressing the underlying imbalance of power and security dilemma?
Today, the escalation of conflict in the Gulf region has not evolved into the next “World War,” but into a system of world wars, conditioned by multipolar structures, characterized by diffuse, asymmetric, and interconnected conflict linking multiple regional crises and theaters of war, while engaging great power competition both directly and indirectly. The robust structural mechanisms theorized by Kenneth Waltz yield different expectations today as the structure shifts toward multipolarity, carrying new implications for the future of deterrence strategies and system-wide proliferation.
The Schelling-type nuclear stability Waltz implies, holds if the logic of strategic and general deterrence is operationally maintained, leaders are risk-averse, and second-strike capabilities are preserved—conditions most clearly met in a bipolar structure, where symmetry in doctrine, firepower, and adversary relationships provides a clear and simplified basis for political calculation and reciprocity under mutually assured destruction. By contrast, multipolarity increases strategic complexity: heterogeneous doctrines, numerous dyads, and shifting alignments create a more competitive environment with stronger first-move incentives, erode mutual understanding of second-strike capabilities and intentions, and increase the risk of misperception, producing an asymmetric environment in which deterrence expectations shift toward immediate signaling to better assess resolve.
To begin, the ongoing crises of the past decades have gradually eroded the reliability of general deterrence in preventing conflict and maintaining nuclear stability. General deterrence refers to a situation in which an attack is deterred before it even occurs, emphasizing the credibility of the defender’s threat. Because nuclear weapons are highly destructive and costly, maintaining general deterrence relies on an overwhelming retaliatory capability. When general deterrence is strong, attempts at immediate deterrence are less likely to arise and, if they do, are more likely to fail.
In the case of the U.S. attack on Iran, its overwhelming power and general deterrence—as illustrated in its initial operation Midnight Hammer—enabled it to act with strong resolve, imposing punishment at a relatively low cost of retaliation from Iran. However, the subsequent escalation of the conflict has undermined the reliability of general deterrence expectations as a whole. Iran’s asymmetric capabilities, both quantitatively (through a smaller arsenal) and qualitatively (through alternative tools such as drones), have been able to inflict significant costs on the U.S. and its allies by targeting countervalue assets, including civilian infrastructure.
In this war, for example, Iran has been able to absorb severe losses and, despite a military defeat, has maintained and enhanced its strategic and political posture, particularly through its leverage over the Strait. In any ceasefire negotiations today, Iran would likely hold a position of considerable bargaining advantage, capable of extracting concessions from the United States—whether in the form of reparations, regional arrangements (e.g., Lebanon), or commercial agreements. At this stage, there appears to be no direct penalty that can........