*Originally published in 2023. Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber, or make a donation, to support our work.

Turkey is a fascinating panoply of religion and secularism. Like most of the largest countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), by territory and by population, Turkey in the 20th century experienced a long experiment with secularism. It is an experiment which, in the case of Turkey, continues to present even with the current ruling, religiously-oriented Justice and Development Party (its acronym, from the Turkish-language name for the party, is AKP). The relationship – and some tension – between secularism and religion appear to be at the forefront of the current Turkish elections. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the religiously-oriented AKP won the largest number of seats, with over 49%; but he did not meet the 50% threshold required to secure victory in the Turkish electoral system. Meanwhile, the opposition candidate, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), received over 44% of the vote.  

The primary choice for Turkish voters appears to be situated along dimensions of religion and nationalism with regard to two questions: secular political institutions and immigration. Incumbent President Erdoğan and the AKP have sought to downplay the significance of religion in AKP policy vis à vis secular institutions and economics, recently returning to classic liberal economic policies. Likewise, while he oversaw an institutional change from parliamentary to presidential system in 2017, strengthening executive power in the aftermath of a 2016 coup, he did not fundamentally change the secular nature of the country’s political institutions or military, such as placing a religious council as highest state body (as in Iran), or installing clerics in important positions of national oversight or political power across the state (and in places where they have not traditionally been located). He has been criticized for tough measures aimed to quell potential irredentist forces on right, left, religious, and secular poles against a future coup, which some have called authoritarian. At the same time, Erdoğan has been responsive to several post-Arab-Spring-related regional crises, creating space for approximately 3 million refugees, some of whom have become immigrants; immigrants are highly supportive of Erdoğan and the AKP.

The 2016 coup appears to have been organized by religious forces significantly right of Erdoğan; some secularists may be opportunistic in capitalizing on the situation to criticize Erdoğan’s policies and religious orientation. Meanwhile, Erdoğan has walked a fine line seeking to maintain the rule of law vis à vis both secular and religious forces that might threaten the state. Claims that the “firewall” between religion and state has been eroded by Erdoğan may be overstated; even allowing a prayer at an opening ceremony has been controversial. Meanwhile, the Religious Affairs Directorate (similar to a Ministry of Religious Affairs) was established not by Erdoğan but by Mustafa Kemal in 1924.

The opposition candidate offers a nationalist platform, which some are calling “social democratic;” it seeks to join the interests of “political, ethnic, and religious groups,” and it represents a broad coalition of opposition parties from left to right. It is not clear how well that coalition would continue to cohere after an election, although the construction of such a coalition is seen by many as a positive development. Identity politics has emerged as highly significant for the opposition, including announcements that presidential candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is in favor of hard policy change against refugees and immigrants; he has vowed to send many of them home.  

Kılıçdaroğlu has moved his party from a strictly secularist party to one favoring ‘reconciliation’........

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