In January 1968, North Korean special forces penetrated the very heart of Seoul in order to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung-hee. The operation, which came alarmingly close to achieving its objective, sent shockwaves throughout South Korea’s leadership, showcasing that South Korea’s internal security was still vulnerable, even after the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953. Barely one year later, another strategic shock hit in a completely different manner. With the election of Richard Nixon, the US’ Asia strategy was fundamentally readjusted: it demanded that US allies assume greater responsibilities when it came  to defending themselves. The aforementioned two incidents — the Blue House raid and the Guam Doctrine — were merged into a single perception for both Japan and South Korea: that US protection cannot be considered as automatic while regional survival would be more dependent on self-reliance and cooperation between Japan and South Korea.

After more than half a century, Japan and South Korea are facing structural unpredictability that strongly reminds us of 1968-69. Donald Trump’s return to the White House revived transactional alliance politics, again amplifying the issue of burden-sharing. At the same time, North Korea has evolved into a full-blown nuclear power, China is testing the threshold of coercion in the Taiwan Strait, and the deepening of military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is adding another unstable axis in Northeast Asia. As such risk elements overlap with one another, it is creating a denser, riskier strategic environment than the Cold War era when the Guam Doctrine was declared. Nevertheless, the strategic logic that Tokyo and Seoul are faced with is strikingly similar. Once again, they must determine whether to remain as passive dependents on the alliance or evolve into a common supplier of regional security. The consequences of this choice in 2025 will have far more decisive implications than the choices that were made in 1969. Yet, in order to grasp today’s dilemma, it is essential to review the initial inflection point. In the late 1960s, Japan and South Korea both experienced the abrupt rupture of strategic clarity. The Blue House raid shattered any remaining belief that South Korea could fully rely on outsiders. North Korea was no longer a conventional threat confined across the DMZ and had proven its ability to directly project asymmetric violence against South Korea’s political core.

Such shock was amplified by the Guam Doctrine. Although it did not formally announce US troop withdrawal from Asia, the doctrine did clearly demonstrate the denouement of an era where US commitments were nearly automatic. Such an implication was grave in a country where the trauma —the US decision to exclude South Korea from its defense perimeter in early 1950 — was still deeply imprinted on the South Korean psyche. It was equally destabilizing to Japan, where its security was buttressed through the 1947 Peace Constitution and US extended deterrence. Although Japan’s reaction was restrained, it was a historically important turning point. In November 1969, Japanese prime minister Sato Eisaku officially announced that

© E-International