Over the last 15 years, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have become a relevant player in world politics. The origins of the bloc can be traced back to a 2001 Goldman Sachs report that highlighted the economic potential of Brazil, India, China, and Russia. With South Africa’s inclusion in 2011, the BRICS have since become an active and increasingly powerful actor in global affairs, aiming to represent the “voice” of the Global South. Led by China’s unrelenting rise in global trade, infrastructure finance, investment, technological innovation, and thirst for natural resources, the bloc has been seen as a potential counterbalance to the US-led liberal international order.

During the last decade, the commercial and financial interactions within the group have increased significantly, accounting for a significant share (20%) of the South-South trade. Moreover, the bloc has been searching to institutionalize with the creation of the New Development Bank (the so-called BRICS Bank) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), both alternatives to the World Bank and the IMF, respectively. These institutions have been accompanied by initiatives to involve their civil societies through projects focusing on education, science, sports, and culture. Indeed, the potential of the BRICS has become so appealing that various countries in the Global South have sought to become another letter in the acronym. In 2023, the BRICS invited several countries to join the bloc, and by 2026, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became full members, while Bolivia, Cuba, Thailand, Vietnam, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uganda, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Uzbekistan became partner countries.       

Since they are primarily concerned with financial and commercial matters, the BRICS’ major challenge to the liberal international order has been their criticism of the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as underlying discussions of the de-dollarization of their commercial transactions. In geopolitical terms, the bloc has instead been a staunch defender of multilateralism and the UN Charter, as repeatedly proclaimed at the BRICS Summits.

Yet the increasing socio-economic and financial interplay within the bloc and between the bloc and the rest of the Global South has not been translated into a greater geopolitical role in world affairs. Indeed, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the BRICS’ political maneuvering has become increasingly complex. On the one hand, the bloc’s discursive support for the UN Charter has become a dead letter due to its ambiguous statements and policies regarding Moscow’s aggression against Kyiv. Condemning Israel and US policies in Venezuela and Iran, while avoiding any criticism towards Russia, has developed into dialectic challenges and discourse creativity during the BRICS summits. The fact that President Vladimir Putin has not attended summits in South Africa and Brazil due to fear of arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against him has shown the limits of sovereign immunity in the 21st century.

On the other hand, the bloc’s expansion seemed to follow a contradictory, confusing approach, to the detriment of establishing a coherent, clear strategy. While it is evident that there is certain disdain for key aspects of the liberal international order (only one democratic country has been admitted as a full member), BRICS expansion seems to prioritize quantity over quality, anchored in anti-Western values, particularly vis-à-vis democracy, human and minority rights, and the secular division of power. While these post-colonial and post-liberal discourses and policies may provide some degree of homogeneity among members, some political groups and minorities within the BRICS countries and their partners will certainly continue to mobilize and advocate for these values.

The BRICS’ uncertain standing in global politics has been accentuated by Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025. The transactionalism favored by the US in its foreign policy has brought back bilateralism as an underlying strategy in international relations. The unpredictable US President has addressed peace negotiations, war strategies, bailouts, and tariffs on a case-by-case basis, avoiding institutional frameworks in which the US’s material and political power can be diluted, such as within the UN. Moreover, this US strategy has specifically targeted the BRICS. President Trump has discouraged and even threatened the members of BRICS for their alleged aim of de-dollarizing their economies.         

The BRICS members’ responses to this new global scenario have undermined the bloc’s role as a political actor. Regarding tariffs, the countries have been pursuing bilateral agreements with the US rather than negotiating as a bloc. Indeed, India and Indonesia have already signed initial agreements with Washington. More importantly, in relation to the recent attacks by the US and Israel on Iran, the BRICS have completely divided. While Brazil and South Africa have condemned the US and Israel’s actions based on sovereignty and international law principles, China has remained ambiguous, and India has refrained from criticizing the attacks and called for dialogue and diplomacy to solve the crisis. Russia has vehemently condemned the attack and welcomed the new Iranian leadership. More importantly for the BRICS as a geopolitical actor, two new members have become part of the war as Iran is retaliating against US targets in the region, affecting the UAE.         

In both critical situations, the BRICS nations have failed to seize the opportunity to establish themselves as a clear, coherent voice for the Global South and as a driving force behind a multilateral order. The lack of a consistent geopolitical strategy aimed at representing a multipolar, post-Western order has disheartened those who viewed the bloc as a groundbreaking and emancipatory player in global politics. The US continues to wield the capacity, through a combination of carrots and sticks, to outmaneuver any counter-hegemonic initiatives. Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent that the differences in geopolitical strategies and national interests among BRICS countries are often more pronounced than those between any individual member and the US.

Can the BRICS then adapt to the current transactional order? As a global actor, the bloc seems reduced to trade, investment, and natural resources. The biggest challenge for the group today lies in maintaining its commercial and economic linkages, as, beyond anti-Western rhetoric, the geopolitical standings of its members appear increasingly divergent. The wars in Ukraine and Iran and the transactionalism presented by the current US administration in its foreign policy have shown that the BRICS lack the cohesion, clarity, and willingness needed to present a political and ideological challenge to the liberal international order. Accordingly, in the medium-to-long term, the resilience of the BRICS will surface if the bloc can present an integrated global strategy that navigates internal and external shocks without affecting their growing economic interactions.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

Opinion – Trump’s Tariffs are the Incentive the BRICS Needed

Political Conclusions of the 2025 BRICS Summit

Opinion – The Status of the BRICS, 20 Years Later

Opinion – Challenges for the Expansion of the BRICS

India-China Rivalry and its Long Shadow Over the BRICS

Opinion – From Bandung to BRICS+? 

Emilio Rodriguez-Triocci is a Research Fellow at the European University Institute’s Florence School of Transnational Governance. His current research focuses on global politics and regional powers; war, violence, and development in the Global South; and peace negotiations, transitional justice initiatives, and democratization in Latin America, Africa, and Europe. He completed his PhD on the Colombian armed conflict at King’s College London (KCL). He also holds an MA in Politics (The New School for Social Research) and an MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights (Utrecht University).

Luis Octavio dos Santos Gouveia Junior

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