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In 2003 I published an essay titled, “Why International Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading Thucydides.” I thought I made a pretty strong case. There was, first of all, the question of anachronism. No modern doctor would base his or her medical practice on the writings of Erasistratus, Herophilus, or Hippocrates, but for some reason International Relations scholars seem to think that whatever Thucydides wrote almost 2,500 years ago still applies today. There was also the question of accuracy. Thucydides told a pretty good tale, but much of it, and certainly the most famous parts, had a “take my word for it” kind of feel. The single most important bit—the claim that “[t]he growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable” and that the Spartans went to war with Athens “not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them”[1]— was, in fact, supported by no evidence whatsoever and contradicted by a very great deal. Thucydides admitted as much himself when he wrote, “The real cause [of war] . . . I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight”[2]. Finally, even if Thucydides still applied, and even if what he said was accurate, there was the question of takeaway. His History is so rich that anyone with any paradigmatic predilection whatsoever could mine it for aid and comfort. If IR theorists were the proverbial blind men, Thucydides would be the proverbial elephant. The Realists got to him first and prominently staked their claim, but there is a very great deal in what he wrote, I argued, that is flatly inconsistent with the Realist take.

Not surprisingly, no one paid attention. IR theorists still read Thucydides. They continue to publish books and articles on Thucydides, or invoking Thucydides, “just as regular as a clock can tick.”[3]

So also do public intellectuals, it seems; for in recent years “The Thucydides Trap” has emerged as a popular image with which to make sense of U.S.-China relations. The term was first coined by Graham Allison in a widely-read 2012 op-ed in The Financial Times. He used it to refer to the combination of China’s rise and the fear this might inspire in the United States that roughly mapped onto Thucydides’ account of Athens’ rise and the fear this provoked in Sparta. The term pithily captures the core idea of A.F.K. Organski’s power transition theory, which postulates that great power wars are likeliest when a rapidly rising challenger threatens to overtake a declining hegemon [4].

Despite Thucydides’ emphasis on fear, both his account of Spartan motivations for war and power transition theory presume an essentially rational calculation: namely, that war now on relatively favorable terms is preferable to war later on relatively unfavorable terms. The issue of inevitability is an important difference, however. Thucydides stated plainly that war between Sparta and Athens was inevitable. Power transition theory would have said only that it was unusually likely. Allison sides with Organski. There is........

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