*Originally published in 2024 and preserved as part of our archive project.Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber to support our work.

This article is part of the Buddhism and International Relations article series, edited by Raghav Dua.

Strategic utilization of Buddhism in Indian foreign policy is a feature that has become particularly noticeable in the last decade, under Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which took power in 2014. Modi has pushed an “Indian vision of Buddhism” which “appeals to ancient history while rooted in contemporary geopolitical concerns” (Lam 2022). The geopolitical concerns reflect the deterioration in India’s relations with China on show with confrontation, casualties and conflict along India’s Buddhist Himalayan frontier – at Doklam in 2017, Galwan in 2020, and Yangtse in December 2022.

Leading analysts were already noting by the end of 2014 that “the PM has put Buddhism at the heart of India’s vigorous new diplomacy.” Two examples suffice from September 2015. At the Mahabodhi Temple in Bodh Gaya, Modi proclaimed:

We in India would like to develop Bodh Gaya so that it can become the spiritual capital and civilisational bond between India and the Buddhist world. The government of India would like to provide all possible support that its Buddhist cousin nations need for the satisfaction of their spiritual needs from this holiest of holy places for them.

We in India would like to develop Bodh Gaya so that it can become the spiritual capital and civilisational bond between India and the Buddhist world. The government of India would like to provide all possible support that its Buddhist cousin nations need for the satisfaction of their spiritual needs from this holiest of holy places for them.

That same month, Modi also initiated a “…‘Samvad’ – Global Hindu-Buddhist Initiative”, in which “India is taking the lead in boosting the Buddhist heritage across Asia.” This Samvad initiative was enthusiastically embraced by Japan’s leader Shinzo Abe. A Samvad framework was then pushed jointly by India and Japan in subsequent years, a geocultural use of Buddhism to offset the geoeconomic allure of China’s Silk Road project.

India is a rising power, with rising hopes for influence in and around its immediate and extended neighborhood. Its power projection is multi-faceted, with geocultural linkages sought for geopolitical purposes. Kishwar noted the “rising role of Buddhism in India’s soft power strategy” in 2018. This soft power Buddhism-facilitated diplomacy is also evident with regard to India’s strategic partnerships with Japan and Mongolia (Sarmah 2022), as well as with Vietnam and South Korea, and with regard to Indian outreach to Thailand, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Tibetan Buddhism has been “a source and strength of Indian soft power diplomacy” (Tsultrim 2020), along the Himalayas with regard to bilateral relations with Nepal and Bhutan, and further afield with regards to Mongolia.

On the immediate geopolitical front, a belt of Tibetan Buddhist-populated areas under Indian control along the Himalayas overlaps with the disputed sovereignty with China. India claims the Aksai Chin plateau held by China, and China claims Arunachal Pradesh held by India. Meanwhile, the actual border line remains an un-demarcated generally unagreed Line of Control with no substantive talks, let alone agreement, on sovereignty.

Ironies are present, as neither China nor India, be it state and/or government are particularly Buddhist. China is officially an atheist state, underpinned by a materialist ideology (Marxist-Leninism) where religion has been seen as the 'opium of the masses’, and in which tight party control exerted by Xi Jinping is shaping a nationalistic and increasingly assertive China. Chinese Buddhism may have widespread adherents, albeit in a traditional syncretic symbiosis with Confucianism and Taoism, but is subordinated to tight Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control and direction. Thus, for the Chinese state media, Xi Jinping’s “Buddhism with Chinese characteristics” is a Buddhism to be deployed for the diplomatic glory of the Chinese state, “an asset that can enhance relations with neighbors [….] the glue that can help bond the region under the Chinese dream” (Chen Lijun 2015). China’s regional dream may of course be India’s nightmare?

India’s case is more complicated. Though Shakyamuni Buddha was born in Lumbini (present-day Nepal), his enlightenment came at Bodh Gaya (India), his ministry was along the Ganges plain of India, and he died at Kushinagar (India). A long period of Buddhist ascendancy in India ensued, complete with the glories of Ashoka’s Mauryan Empire and Buddhist expansion from India around Asia. Buddhism was severely critical of Hinduism’s caste system and theistic trappings. Eventually though it was reabsorbed back into Hinduism, the Buddha being recognized as an incarnation (avatar) of Vishnu, but an incarnation bringing a false doctrine (Buddhism) to the demons (asuras), to distract them away from the correct Hinduism. The current BJP presents a tradition of Hindu nationalism domestically fused with a strong India externally. Consequently, the BJP has been very willing to re-invoke the Buddha and his ethics (rather than his theistic critiques of Hinduism) as a figure of “Indian” greatness. Modi’s own stress on Yoga gives another experiential opening to Buddhism, with both being a feature of Indian soft power religiosity.

Beyond its borders, India’s use of Buddhism in its wider neighborhood brings it up against China, similarly engaged in international rise and aspirations in the same strategic backyards, and similarly deploying Buddhism in its diplomacy. Scott profiled this emergent rival deployment of Buddhism in........

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