Opinion – ZOPACAS at 40: A Reflection on Brazil-Africa Relations |
In 2026, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) will be celebrating its 40th anniversary. This milestone is not only an invitation to reflect on the creation, achievements, and limitations of the Zone, but on how it relates to broader dynamics associated with South-South cooperation and Brazil-Africa relations in the past four decades. With a total of 24 member states, including Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Namibia, and Uruguay, the Zone has helped Brazil expand its connections with states in the Atlantic coast of Africa beyond its traditional Lusophone partners such as Angola, Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Created by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/41/11 which was adopted on October 27, 1986, ZOPACAS was expected to innovate on previous efforts by the UN to approve zones of peace such as the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace of December 1971. The inclusion of ‘cooperation’ was intended to add to the efforts in constructing a space of peace in the South Atlantic by emphasizing the possibility of concrete South-South initiatives in areas where participating states could share experiences such as the protection of maritime resources and international law of the sea. The timing of the creation of the Zone reflected the strengthening of South-South technical cooperation, particularly after the 1978 Buenos Aires Action Plan, and UN efforts to endorse and support these initiatives.
ZOPACAS was a product of Cold War dynamics. First, it reflected concerns regarding the 1982 conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina regarding the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) dispute which placed on opposing sides a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a member of the Interamerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR, in its Spanish acronym). Second, it reflected a concern that existing animosities between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) could expand into the South Atlantic space. This was already a cause for concern looking back at the civil war in Angola (1975-2002) with the presence of troops from Cuba and apartheid South Africa. Furthermore, the idea of promoting a concrete initiative in the format of a UNGA-approved zone of peace and cooperation was a response to efforts by apartheid South Africa to court support from South American dictatorships in addressing the risks of a Communist threat in the South Atlantic. If successful, this could have led to the establishment of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO). Siding with the apartheid regime would have undermined Brazil’s international engagement. Therefore, at the time, the proposal and approval of the Zone coincided with a more proactive posture by the Brazilian government in sanctioning and limiting contact with the authorities in Pretoria.
ZOPACAS reached its final configuration when Namibia joined after its independence in 1990 and South Africa in 1994, following the end of apartheid. Moreover, the Zone was shaped by the different ministerial meetings which have taken place since 1986, the first one in Rio de Janeiro (1988), followed by meetings in Abuja (1990), Brasília (1994), Somerset West (1996), Buenos Aires (1998), Luanda (2007), Montevideo (2013), and Mindelo (2023). Like ZOPACAS, Brazil-Africa relations were often characterized by periods of intense interaction and periods of stagnation. For example, throughout the 1990s, many Brazilian embassies in the African continent were closed, an indication that priorities were envisioned elsewhere, including an interest in engaging more actively with Asian countries and deepening South American integration. Civil wars in different ZOPACAS African member states also limited the opportunities for cooperation.
The beginning of a Workers’ Party administration in Brazil, first with two terms by President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), and then with President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), repositioned the importance of Africa and the Global South in Brazil’s international trajectory. New embassies were inaugurated (or reopened) in the African continent followed by a number of defense cooperation agreements and the creation of new defense attaché positions, prioritizing states located in the Atlantic coast. At the moment, the naval cooperation started with Namibia in 1994 is being replicated, according to local specificities, in Cabo Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe. In addition to participating in multinational maritime exercises led by France (GRAND AFRICAN NEMO) or the USA (OBANGAME EXPRESS), Brazil has created its own exercise (GUINEX) to train and exchange experiences with ZOPACAS partners.
Since its creation, ZOPACAS has faced several challenges that impact South-South cooperation initiatives. The diversity of members provides legitimacy to the initiative, but it also means that the levels of commitment tend to vary. In many cases, when contacting their counterparts in African countries, Brazilian diplomats encountered a lack of knowledge of the Zone. Another challenge involves the complexity and multiplicity of the topics discussed under the ZOPACAS framework, ranging from academic cooperation to addressing maritime security. Not all member states have the institutional capacity to provide expertise or follow-up on all the items on the agenda. In some cases, the complexity of the agenda makes it difficult for some member states to even identify which government ministry is better suited to take the lead in ZOPACAS-related events.
The gaps between meetings, particularly between 1998 and 2007, and 2013 and 2023 illustrate that challenges of a logistical nature also come into play such as competing national, regional, and international commitments, finding the means required to bring delegations to cross the Atlantic, and the availability of translators to cover English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. These challenges tend to elevate expectations regarding the role that Brazil would play as the main proponent and (expected) paymaster of ZOPACAS. For example, for the Montevideo meeting, the Brazilian Air Force mobilized aircrafts to bring African delegations, and Brazil also gave financial support regarding the translation service. Host countries of ministerial meetings have also relied on Brazil’s extensive diplomatic network in Africa (compared to the limited number of Argentine and Uruguayan embassies) to convince member states on the importance of sending high-level representatives to the meetings. In the absence of meetings, representatives of ZOPACAS member states meet on the sidelines of the UNGA sections in New York City, and Brazil has worked with other member states so that the UNGA continues to regularly endorse resolutions mentioning ZOPACAS.
President Lula da Silva’s inauguration for a third mandate starting in January 2023, and the relaunch of Brazil-Africa relations under his new term in office coincided with the relaunch of ZOPACAS with the long-awaited meeting held in Mindelo and hosted by Cabo Verde in April 2023. The meeting had been postponed on different occasions, including 2015 and 2022, due to low level of confirmations from member states. After more than ten years since the previous gathering in Montevideo, the Final Declaration and the Plan of Action that came out from Mindelo left important decisions to be made for the forthcoming Rio de Janeiro ministerial which will take place from 8-9 April, 2026, including the possibility of setting a more institutionalized structure and the possibility of creating a ZOPACAS Defense College.
While keeping the regularity of ministerial meetings remains a challenge, other high-level initiatives connecting the two sides of the South Atlantic were promoted along the years. Between 2006 and 2013, leaders from the two sides met at different editions of the Africa-South America (ASA) Summit. More recently, the High-Level Forum between the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and Africa held in Bogotá (Colombia) in March 2026 served as an opportunity to reinforce solidarity and cooperation among African, Latin American, and Caribbean States. In his speech at the forum, President Lula reminded of the recognition that Latin America and the Caribbean constitute the African Union’s sixth region, mentioned the need to keep the South Atlantic free from external geopolitical disputes, making reference to the upcoming ZOPACAS ministerial meeting to be held in Rio de Janeiro in April 2026.
ZOPACAS is undoubtedly a diplomatic asset. It has survived the end of the Cold War and the geopolitical challenges of a multipolar world, including the emerging competition between the USA and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the ongoing crisis of multilateralism. In addition, it has promoted South-South cooperation and the denuclearization of the South Atlantic. Its commitment regarding the protection of the maritime environment reflects one of the pressing needs of the international agenda. For Brazil, it offers an opportunity to speak to its immediate neighborhood and creates an ongoing test of its engagement with broader South-South relations. This will require more than soft power as Brazil will have to creatively adapt to a more competitive scenario, where different players, from both the North and the South, have established ties with African partners. The continuity of Brazil’s engagement within ZOPACAS will require domestic mobilization of government agencies and support for concrete cooperative efforts in complementary areas such as maritime security and sustainable development.
The views and opinions expressed in this contribution are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institution.
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Danilo Marcondes holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge. He is a tenured Assistant Professor at the Brazilian Naval War College (EGN), and a Senior Researcher with the Africa Program at the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI). Danilo is also a Productivity Research Scholar with Brazil’s National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), and a Young Researcher Scholar (JCNE) with the Rio de Janeiro State Research Foundation (FAPERJ).
Adeleke Olumide Ogunnoiki