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While dealing with ways to counter religiously motivated terrorism or violent extremism, it is essential to begin by understanding the fundamental nature of violent extremism as an evolutionary concept that morphs based on temporal, cultural and geopolitical circumstances (Borum 2011, 1-6). Religiously motivated violent extremism is generally defined as an act committed to humiliate and kill all those who may dare to challenge or defy the hegemony of the God of perpetrator’s choice. While it may seem senseless mass slaughter to most, to the terrorists and their sympathisers, it is redemption (Simon and Benjamin 2002, 40). More often than not, the response to such acts of violence is delivered through the deployment of disproportionately higher levels of aggression, mostly through a militarised mechanism. America’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks is a case in point. However, to estimate the veracity of such a response, one needs to first appreciate how an individual travels through a pathway that leads to violent extremism. We will use what, in the authors’ view, is the most comprehensive model available to understand the pathways to violent extremism – and then study the efficacy of the militarised response mechanisms by comparing them with the results such approaches have achieved. The article thereafter attempts to prescribe alternative models for countering violent extremism (CVE) to demonstrate their effectiveness and conclude that a contextually relevant and blended (hard and soft) approach has historically proven to be most effective.

Understanding the Pathways to Violent Extremism

As John Horgan stated, it is more important to focus on how people acculturate themselves into violent extremism than on why they do so (2008, 80-94). While there are several models that have been proposed, especially in the post-9/11 era, the authors here rely on the Radical Pathway (RP) framework as espoused by Kumar Ramakrishna (2009, 25-31). The choice of this framework over other models stems from the fact that it offers a multidimensional approach. Unlike other, mostly linear models, it explores the interplay of various socio-cultural as well as geopolitical factors and how the output of such chemistry may impact different individuals uniquely. Thus, the RP framework is not only multi-faceted, it also appreciates the inimitability of individual personalities and their ability to respond to a certain concoction of life’s realities distinctively.

The Radical Pathway framework (see Figure 1) is anchored on the work of Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede (2005). It leverages four concentric circles or layers revolving around an individual. While retaining Hofstedes’ three elements of Culture, Human Nature, and Individual Personality, the framework takes a more nuanced approach and attempts to refashion them in some ways. At the core of this model is the ‘Situated Individual Personality’ whose innate nature is influenced by the culture she or he is exposed to. However, according to Ramakrishna, the dynamics of the individual’s situation: geopolitical realities, ideologies and small group influences, shape her or his outlook towards their existential realities. It is in this context that when the individual perceives an ‘Existential Reality Threat’, she or he is transitioned from a non-violent person (who may or may not be radical in her or his views) into a violent extremist. What this framework and others like it tell us is that violent extremism is a product of complex interactions of personality traits, situational context, and perceptions. As such, the response to violent extremism or CVE should also be nuanced enough and not a unidimensional, force-on-force approach.

As are the triggers to violent extremism varied, so are the levels of threats emanating out of it. Given this reality, the CVE response mechanism should take into account the threat levels as well as the second and tertiary order consequences of such responses. Hence, a response divorced of the appreciation of the various factors involved and the threats emanating thereof may lead to a Sisyphean cycle of endless conflict.

America’s War on Terror

The militarised response to 9/11 by America and its allies is what can be characterised as a hard approach to CVE. Andrew J. Bacevich has defined the War on Terror as a succession of three rounds. Round one he says, is the technology-driven swift action war which was personified by the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Round two was the counter-insurgency strategy led by General David Petraeus, which was the fundamental logic behind the surge. Round three had a rather discrete poster boy; Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence of the Obama administration, Michael Vickers, who was an accomplished CIA officer of the Afghan Jihad vintage. His approach seemed to mirror that of the enemies he was fighting in some ways. A key component of this was targeted killings of both potential and acting terrorists with more than its fair share of collateral damage. The Obama administration’s controversial drone program was a direct fallout of such strategies.

The failure of the War on Terror is almost too apparent. Data suggests that in the 15 years preceding 9/11 (1986-2001), there were four terror attacks in America killing 10 Americans while in the next 15 years, there were eight attacks killing 88 Americans. Similarly, the number of Islamic terror groups in the world was 13 in the period of 1986-2001. While in 2015, the number had shot up to 44. Given the above data as well as with the advent of Taliban 2.0 in Afghanistan, it can be argued that the impact of the War on Terror has actually been counter-productive. As Peter Byrne points out, there has been a surge in terrorism both in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result of troop surges. Byrne ascribes this to the nature of terror groups which he labels as “anti-fragile.” These groups, he posits, strengthen under attacks and have shown the ability to operate fairly independently in relation to their central command-and-control structures. Byrne also asserts that the harder these groups are hit, the easier it becomes for them to maintain a steady supply of new recruits, a second-order consequence of the War on Terror. This merits an inquiry into what led to such a failure of the United States military. We attempt to analyse this in the next section.

Addressing What Needs to be Addressed and Not What is Popular/Convenient

A question often asked is how to defeat a guy who looks down the barrel of a gun and sees heaven. A further extension of this question would be to answer it in a group context. For a successful CVE campaign, identifying the center of gravity of the adversary is critical. More often than not, it is seen, that the center of gravity of violent extremist groups is not their military might. Hence trying to tackle these groups militarily only augments the problem. Like in the War on Terror, a similar lesson can be drawn from the counter-productive initial British strategy of Battalion-Swipe in their Malaya campaign (Nagl 2002, 59-65). Global experiences have shown that the center of gravity in a........

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