Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific: From Normative Vision to Security Statecraft |
Japan’s foreign and security policy changed significantly over the past decade in response to a more contested Indo-Pacific order. Central to this evolution is the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy, which originated under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as a broad, normative vision promoting the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and economic prosperity (Nagy 2021; Hosoya 2019). However, as systemic pressures have intensified – most notably China’s maritime assertiveness, the geopolitical shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – Tokyo has profoundly recalibrated its approach (O’Shea and Maslow 2024). Viewing this shift through the lens of neoclassical realism, this study argues that FOIP has moved from a purely diplomatic vision towards a highly operationalised framework as a concrete security instrument. The transformation, although not a complete abandonment of Japan’s pacifist ideals, is a pragmatic adaptation where acute external threats are filtered through domestic institutional, societal, and legal constraints (Kim 2025). Through the practice of “tactical hedging” and the deployment of new, tangible policy instruments like Official Security Assistance (OSA) and revised defence export guidelines, Japan has successfully merged inclusive regional rhetoric with concrete military balancing, making FOIP both a normative framework and a practical instrument of security policy.
FOIP, originally promoted by Japan as a rules-based, open, and inclusive regional vision, has evolved far beyond a simple diplomatic stance today. In recent years, Japan has introduced stronger security instruments, such as the 2022 security documents, the establishment of OSA in 2023, and revised defence equipment export rules, which have become operational mechanisms for reinterpreting Japan’s FOIP vision. This raises the question: how and why has FOIP changed under a worsening geopolitical environment? The study argues that FOIP has not abandoned its normative foundations, but has increasingly been operationalised through concrete security instruments, including the 2022 Three Security Documents, Official Security Assistance, and revised defence equipment transfer rules.
FOIP between Norms and Strategy
First, one strand of scholarship interprets Japan’s FOIP primarily as a normative and diplomatic posture aimed at preserving a rules-based order through openness, connectivity, and inclusivity. Green (2018) argues that Japan’s strategic worldview revolves around its FOIP vision, which emphasises the inherent benefits from a regional order rooted in the rule of law, transparency, and high-quality rules for trade and infrastructure. This vision has evolved, as highlighted by Hosoya (2019, 25), that Japan has transitioned to a “FOIP 2.0” – shifting away from confrontational rhetoric to emphasise a more cooperative, inclusive, comprehensive vision in response to the voices of Asian countries. Furthermore, Nagy (2021) explains Japan’s approach to regionalism by arguing that FOIP relies on a ‘rational-legal perspective,’ stressing broad cooperation and transparency, and fiscally sustainable infrastructure, as opposed to a more state-centric model.
Secondly, a substantial body of literature reads FOIP less as a neutral order-building but as a more strategic response to China’s rise, maritime assertiveness, and intensifying Indo-Pacific power competition. Nagy (2021, 10) notes that Tomohiko Satake views FOIP as a direct geo-economic alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Driven by existential concerns over open sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in the East and South China Seas, Nagy (2021) views FOIP’s focus on maritime security as a response to regional instability and Chinese assertiveness. While navigating the transition of power between the United States and China, Wilkins (2021, 98) describes Australia and Japan as engaging in a “triple hedge,” where middle-power diplomacy through FOIP acts as a critical mechanism to offset risks while remaining traditional security partners with the United States. Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy, according to Naidu and Ishida (2022), deliberately aimed at creating a regional balance of power that could counter China’s growing assertiveness through minilateral coalitions like the Quad and deepening defence cooperation with Southeast Asia. These views of balancing behaviour align with what Koga (2019, 289) conceptualises the FOIP as “tactical hedging” – utilisation of an ambiguous declaratory policy to build coalitions and signal strategic alignment without escalating tensions.
Third, more recent literature moves beyond what we discuss above as the normative-versus-balancing debate, i.e. Japan’s profound shift into a more proactive security actor. Hughes (2024, 162) extensively analyses the 2022 “three national security documents” – the National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, and Defence Buildup Program – arguing they enforce a “radical military trajectory” by discarding the one per cent GDP limit on defence expenditure since 1976. Japan has reinforced its defence capabilities, exclusively altering its defence-oriented policy, thereby increasing debate on Japan’s deviations from past stances and far more change than continuity in core principles (Hughes 2024, 183). Jain (2026, 38) also noted that Japan has replaced post-war idealism with pragmatic realism – expanding the “proactive contribution to peace” mandate through an unprecedented increase in defence budget with further relaxation in arms transfer policy. A pivotal element of this transformation is the introduction of the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework in 2023 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2025). Hamada (2025) and Kim (2025) detail how OSA is distinct from Official Development Assistance (ODA) – OSA allows Japan to provide defence equipment directly to like-minded partner countries’ armed forces, helping to strengthen regional deterrence.........