According to the German professor of law Ulrich K. Preuss, there are four ‘ideal types’ of constitutions. Preuss’ study focuses on what nature of judiciary such constitutions produce. The ‘types’ are named by me.

Type 1 constitution is the outcome of a revolutionary upheaval. This constitution is designed to allow ‘the people’s will’ to impose its political and social ideals upon the whole society. Prominent examples in this regard are constitutions authored during or soon after the 18th century revolution in France, and the Russian revolution in 1917.

There is no place for a constitutional court in such constitutions, nor do they give any other courts the power to interpret the constitution. The judiciary’s sole function in such constitutions is to shape a new polity and strengthen it by implementing ‘people’s will’, as defined by those leading ‘the people.’ These are usually new power elites that have replaced the old elites.

Type 2 constitution is the result of strife between varied ethnic groups who have all been slotted in a single nation-state. The constitution and the judiciary in this regard attempt to shape a collective and consensual nationalism through mediative mechanisms and interventions to keep the peace between the groups.

Type 3 constitution is dictated by conquerors and adopted by the conquered. The most prominent examples in this regard are Japan and Germany, who were defeated by the Western allies in the Second World War and then coerced to adopt constitutions that embodied the ‘constitutional spirit’ of Western democracies. The judiciary under such constitutions works more or less in the same manner as it does in Western democracies.

While........

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