The Afghan Faultline Returns |
On May 27, 2025, Moscow and Kabul announced that they had signed a military?technical cooperation pact–the first formal step since Russia recognised the Taliban regime almost a year ago after removing it from the list of banned terrorist groups.
Interestingly, around the same time, Pakistan’s deputy premier and foreign minister, Ishaq Dar, en route to Washington, prepared to tell his American hosts that Afghanistan’s soil must not be used by the Tehreek?i?Taliban Pakistan or other groups that terrorise Pakistan. These two movements-one toward arms and alliances, the other toward diplomatic persuasion-frame the fault lines across which Afghanistan is once again being pulled. Dar was coming straight from China where a joint statement issued to mark the conclusion of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s trip emphasised:: The two sides stressed on the need of not allowing any individual, group or party, including the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) etc., to use the territories to harm and threaten regional security and interests, or conduct terrorist actions and activities.”
In geopolitics, the first handshake often becomes a door through which others eventually walk.
In geopolitics, the first handshake often becomes a door through which others eventually walk.
Moscow’s pact with the Taliban is not a sentimental embrace. It is rooted in three hard calculations that Russia has been telegraphing for months. First, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) threatens Russian interests in Central Asia, and the Russian security chief Alexander Bortnikov has even accused British intelligence of working with ISKP to weaken Kabul.
Second, Russia wants........