As BRICS Meet to Fight Trump Tariffs, is It Time for Multi-Polar or Anti-Polar Politics? |
On September 8, at an emergency online meeting called by Lula to discuss trade, the BRICS leaders will be put to a serious test: in the face of chaotic US tariff policies, can they transcend their isolated, individualistic bilateral negotiations with Washington, and finally work collectively?
If the Western liberal political empire has been shamed beyond repair by the genocide in Palestine and the neoliberal project cannot be recovered (despite claims to inequality reduction, food security, or “climate action”, as proposed for the Johannesburg G20 summit in November) — what’s next?
Expectations have recently risen for a revived “multipolarism”, partly because the BRICS bloc (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) continues to grow in terms of population, GDP, and geopolitical gravity, having added new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates at the Johannesburg Summit in 2023. Saudi Arabia is often also included as an imminent member, while Indonesia joined earlier this year. There are also ten new “partners” with observer status: Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. They exhibit a wide variety of political persuasions and one, Bolivia, just took a sharp rightward turn (although, unlike Argentina in 2023, that may not prevent it from retaining a BRICS alignment).
The bloc’s July 2025 summit was hosted in Rio de Janeiro by centre-left Brazilian President (and Workers’ Party leader) Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In spite of the widely anticipated failure to address the range of issues that a serious multipolarista would insist upon in Rio, the subsequent weeks have shaken geopolitical certainties and given the BRICS a new aura.
Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and Trump met in Alaska on 15 August with no change in the Ukraine war resulting, except Moscow’s more intensive bombing of civilians, leaving the US leader “very disappointed”. But because of fallout from the imposition of new US tariffs in August — especially against Brazil and India (Putin’s second main oil customer) — anger swelled and Deutsche Welle correctly asked, “Will BRICS boom under Trump’s watch?”
The traditionally security-oriented Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s gathering in Tianjin on 31 August–1 September included Putin’s high-profile role and at least temporary rapprochement between often-fractious Indian and Chinese leaders Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping. The latter will co-host the next two BRICS summits, respectively.
But between the two over the past decade, durable tensions have risen from border conflicts — especially on Himalayan territory, e.g. adverse impacts anticipated from Chinese construction of the world’s largest dam there — plus Beijing’s close ties to Delhi’s enemies in Pakistan. In 2020, after dozens of soldiers died in mountain fighting, India imposed sanctions on Chinese technology and foreign direct investment, and even prohibited direct air flights — which now may be relaxed.
On September 8, in an emergency online meeting called by Lula to discuss trade, the BRICS leaders will be put to an even more serious test: uniting in response to chaotic US tariff policies. These are very high against Brazil (50%), India (50%, China (30%) and South Africa (30%), but only 10 percent against Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Among the 10 BRICS partners, Thailand faces tariffs of 36%; Kazakhstan 25%; Malaysia 24%; Vietnam 20%; Nigeria 14%; and Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Uganda and Uzbekistan 10%.
The Trump threat to impose an extra 10% tariff on any BRICS member simply for being in the network was not carried out. And major exemptions exist for electronics, energy and minerals. Given the different interests at work, can the BRICS transcend their isolated, individualistic bilateral negotiations with Washington, and finally work collectively?
This may be impossible, for after all, scores of national leaders were “calling us up, kissing my ass”, as Trump bragged back in April, shortly after his initial “Liberation Day” round of irrational tariff increases. Of BRICS members and partners, only Vietnam has since succeeded in cutting a trade deal (others are South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the European Union). Lula called Trump’s politicking “unacceptable blackmail”.
Still, pessimism regarding a multipolar revolt against US trade politricks remains appropriate. As several Brasilia sources told Bloomberg on 1 September, the BRICS are again likely to fall short of systematic resistance: “Lula does not want the meeting to turn into an anti-US summit”, even though Trump levied a 50 percent tariff on Brazilian exports in retaliation for his government’s prosecution of predecessor Jair Bolsonaro following a failed January 2023 coup attempt.
Multipolar Myths
Nevertheless, some on the international Left believe that there is now much greater potential for the BRICS to generate new power relations based on mutual respect and a fair global economic playing field. They would point out how the word “peace”’ appeared 41 times in the Rio Leaders Declaration.
But to make this case plausible, the multipolar movement would need clear victories against the destructive hegemony of Western imperial interests, including the neoliberal World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank. These interests are based on the expansion agenda of corporations — especially financiers, merchants, Big Data capitalists, Big Pharma, and the extractive industries — which have long dominated most Western multilateral institutions’ policies.
Yet in the current context, alleged reform at the Bretton Woods Institutions has now gone into reverse. WTO leader Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala admits that partly due to her institution’s disempowerment by Trump (dating to 2019), “the global trading system is today experiencing its worst disruptions since the Second World War. Multilateral cooperation itself is being called into question … WTO economists have downgraded expectations for merchandise trade volume growth by nearly three percentage points and now expect a 0.2 per cent contraction in........