Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often spoken of building “people-to-people” bridges with Bangladesh. It is a noble phrase. But diplomacy, like politics, eventually runs into arithmetic. For more than a decade, New Delhi invested heavily (politically, diplomatically, even emotionally) in its partnership with Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League. But, in Bangladesh’s 13th parliamentary election, the people delivered a clear mandate to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). That democratic verdict should matter in New Delhi. If India is serious about engaging the people of Bangladesh, it must engage the party they have chosen to govern them.

There is no mystery about who now dominates Bangladesh’s political imagination. Tarique Rahman has emerged as the most talked-about figure in the country. After years in exile and political uncertainty, he led BNP to a landslide victory. His electoral messaging—emphasizing family values, economic revival, and national dignity—resonated widely. In politics, perception is reality. And right now, Rahman embodies change for millions of Bangladeshis.

India, meanwhile, has given shelter to former prime minister Sheikh Hasina. That decision, by most accounts, was bipartisan in New Delhi. It reflects India’s long-standing relationship with Hasina and her party, the Awami League. But here is the uncomfortable truth: history is rarely sentimental. States that anchor their foreign policy too tightly to one political figure often find themselves adrift when the political tide turns.

India now faces a structural necessity, not a matter of preference. It must rebuild and recalibrate relations with a BNP-led Bangladesh—not because it wishes to abandon old friends, but because strategic realities demand it.

Bangladesh is not a peripheral state in India’s foreign policy calculus. It is central. Geographically, it wraps around India’s vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, the narrow strip that connects mainland India to its Northeast. Any instability—or worse, hostility—in Dhaka magnifies India’s internal security concerns. The Bay of Bengal, too, has become a theatre of increasing geopolitical competition. Stability in Bangladesh is not optional for India; it is essential.

Trade figures underscore this interdependence. Bilateral trade between the two countries stands at approximately $13.4 billion. The balance tilts heavily in India’s favor, making Bangladesh one of India’s largest trading partners in South Asia. This economic relationship supports industries, supply chains, and energy flows on both sides of the border. But economic asymmetry can quickly breed resentment if it is perceived as political favoritism.

If India is seen as overly aligned with one party—especially a party that is now banned in Bangladesh and most of its leaders are on run —it risks turning economic cooperation into a political grievance. Markets do not operate in a vacuum; they respond to diplomatic winds. And winds can shift rapidly.

There is also the matter of geopolitical competition. China’s footprint in Bangladesh has expanded steadily over the past decade, from infrastructure financing to defense cooperation. Pakistan, too, watches events in Dhaka with renewed interest. If India appears hesitant, distant, or selective in its engagement, others will not hesitate to fill the vacuum. Strategic vacuums rarely remain empty for long.

For New Delhi, the choice is not between BNP and Awami League. The choice is between relevance and irrelevance.

Engaging with Tarique Rahman does not require India to disown Sheikh Hasina. It requires political maturity—the ability to separate personal loyalties from national interests. Diplomacy is not about nostalgia; it is about navigating the present with clarity. Political leaders of India must remember that the ‘anti-India’ sentiments were grown just because of Sheikh Hasina. Her misrule and devastating foreign policies have ignited the anti-India sentiments in the society.

Skeptics will argue that BNP’s past rhetoric has sometimes been critical of India. True enough. Political campaigns often sharpen contrasts. But governing is different from campaigning. Leaders who come to power on the strength of economic promises tend to prioritize growth over grievance. Rahman has repeatedly emphasized an economy-driven foreign policy—one that seeks investment, trade expansion, and regional connectivity. Such an approach aligns, in many respects, with India’s own economic ambitions.

Moreover, engagement reduces risk. Isolation amplifies it.

Consider the alternative scenario: India maintains a cool distance, citing discomfort or distrust. In that vacuum, anti-India narratives could flourish. Rival powers could present themselves as more reliable partners. Imported extremism and competitive political storytelling could surge, complicating border management and intelligence cooperation. None of this would serve India’s interests.

Bangladesh’s domestic politics will remain complex. Supporters of Sheikh Hasina may attempt to sabotage any warming of ties between New Delhi and Dhaka’s new leadership. Political rivalries do not dissolve overnight. But that is precisely why engagement is necessary. Constructive diplomacy can stabilize bilateral relations even when internal politics are turbulent.

It is worth remembering that India’s greatest diplomatic successes in South Asia have come when it engaged broadly—across parties, ideologies, and personalities. Over-identification with a single political actor, however close the relationship, narrows options. A diversified diplomatic portfolio is not a betrayal; it is prudence.

A disengaged India risks watching Bangladesh drift deeper into a China-Pakistan strategic orbit. It risks losing influence in the Bay of Bengal. It risks allowing anti-India narratives to calcify. Most dangerously, it risks undermining its own “Neighbourhood First” doctrine by appearing selective in its respect for democratic outcomes.

There is also a moral dimension. If India champions democratic processes globally, it must respect democratic outcomes regionally. The Bangladeshi electorate has spoken. Ignoring that verdict would send a troubling signal—not only to Dhaka but to the broader neighborhood.

This does not mean naivety. India should pursue its interests firmly: safeguarding border security, ensuring continued cooperation against insurgency, and deepening economic integration. But firmness need not preclude flexibility. Engagement can be both principled and pragmatic.

At stake is more than a bilateral relationship. The stability of the Bay of Bengal region, the security of India’s Northeast, and the future of South Asian connectivity all intersect in Dhaka. A strained India-Bangladesh relationship would reverberate far beyond the subcontinent.

Narendra Modi once spoke of building bridges between peoples. That aspiration remains valid. But bridges require pillars on both sides. Today, one of those pillars is Tarique Rahman and the BNP government he leads. Recognizing that reality is not an endorsement of ideology; it is an acknowledgment of political fact.

India’s foreign policy has long prided itself on strategic autonomy. Exercising that autonomy now means recalibrating without resentment, engaging without hesitation, and prioritizing long-term stability over short-term sentiment.

In the end, nations are judged not by the friendships they preserve, but by the futures they secure. For India, engaging seriously and respectfully with a BNP-led Bangladesh is not merely advisable. It is necessary—for its security, for its economic interests, and for its standing in a rapidly shifting region. The time for recalibration is now.

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