Recognition, freedom, and the assault on transgender existence
Recent efforts to withdraw federal funding from hospitals that provide gender-affirming care to transgender adolescents represent more than a controversial policy choice. They constitute an assault on the very conditions under which transgender people can exist as recognized members of the moral and political community. While such a move is indefensible from familiar ethical standpoints—utilitarian and deontological alike—it is from a Fichtean perspective that its deeper irrationality comes into view. Properly understood, this policy is not merely unjust or harmful; it is a denial of recognition that strikes at the heart of the state’s purpose and undermines the intelligibility of healthcare as a public institution.
From a utilitarian standpoint, the policy fails in straightforward terms. The predictable consequences include increased psychological distress, higher rates of depression and suicidality among transgender youth, disruption of clinical care, and the withdrawal of trust from healthcare institutions. Even if one brackets contested empirical debates, the asymmetry is stark: the harms are concrete and concentrated, while the alleged benefits are speculative, diffuse, or symbolic. A policy that foreseeably increases suffering without demonstrable compensating gains cannot be justified by any plausible calculus of overall welfare.
From a deontological perspective, the policy fares no better. It instrumentalizes a vulnerable population for ideological ends, treating transgender adolescents not as ends in themselves but as means to a broader cultural or political agenda. By coercively restricting access to medically recognized forms of care—care sought by patients, families, and clinicians acting in good faith—it violates duties of respect, nonmaleficence, and professional integrity. Even on conservative Kantian grounds, such a policy cannot be universalized without contradiction: a healthcare system that selectively withholds care from disfavored identities undermines the very idea of equal moral standing.
These objections are decisive—but they remain incomplete. They describe what is wrong with the policy, not why it is fundamentally unintelligible as an act of state power. For that, we must turn to Fichte.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s philosophy begins from a radical and demanding........





















Toi Staff
Sabine Sterk
Gideon Levy
Mark Travers Ph.d
Waka Ikeda
Tarik Cyril Amar
Grant Arthur Gochin