Iran’s Eschatological Rage Does Not Render Victory Impossible |
Foreign Policy > Iran
Iran’s Eschatological Rage Does Not Render Victory Impossible
Even for the most fanatic regimes, ground realities still matter.
Monty Donohew | March 29, 2026
Victor Davis Hanson’s appearance on Hannity highlighted his assessment that the signals are all pointing in one direction: Iran’s regime is on borrowed time. U.S. and Israeli operations have rendered Iran’s conventional forces largely inert, its proxy network fractured, its air defenses and missile capabilities severely degraded, and its last hope being that American domestic politics or fatigue force a premature halt to the conflict. If President Trump maintains resolve, the regime will fall.
That analysis, though, has drawn criticism; some argue that Iran’s eschatological rage—that is, the regime’s deep-rooted theological worldview—makes it uniquely immune to material pressure. In this view, “realities on the ground” (battlefield losses, sanctions, proxy attrition, or economic collapse) are inapplicable because Iran’s leaders operate in an apocalyptic framework that prioritizes confrontation over conventional survival.
This critique deserves serious engagement. Iran’s ideology does shape its behavior in ways that secular analysts often underestimate. But the claim that eschatological belief renders ground realities irrelevant overreaches. History and theology both show that even fervent regimes ultimately confront the limits of the material world.
The Islamic Republic is rooted in Twelver Shia Islam. Central to this faith is the belief in twelve infallible Imams, descended from the Prophet Muhammad. The twelfth, Muhammad al-Mahdi (born circa 869–870 CE), entered “occultation” (ghaybah or hidden state), first a lesser phase, then the greater, which continues today. He is hidden by divine will and will reappear as the Mahdi (“the Rightly Guided One”) and Qa’im (“the Riser”) at the end of time.
Traditional Twelver sources describe his return occurring amid global chaos, injustice, tyranny, bloodshed, and apocalyptic upheaval. Only after defeating the forces of evil will he establish universal justice before the Day of Judgment.
What makes Iran’s version activist rather than quietist is the 1979 Revolution under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) positioned the Supreme Leader as the Mahdi’s interim representative. The Islamic Republic was framed as the advance guard of the Mahdi, tasked with exporting revolution, confronting “oppressors” (the U.S. as the “Great Satan,” Israel as the “Little Satan”), and helping create chaotic conditions that hasten the end times.
This framing is embedded in the Iranian constitution, IRGC indoctrination, and public statements. Leaders have described the regime as paving the way for the “Imam of the Age,” with actions against Israel and the West often cast in explicitly eschatological terms. The result is theological incentive for perpetual resistance, as compromise risks delaying the Mahdi’s arrival or inviting divine disfavor. The result is high risk tolerance and a willingness to absorb enormous self-inflicted costs, behaviors that can appear irrational by conventional standards.
Such conviction explains why Iran has defied sanctions that impoverish its people, prioritized anti-Israel operations over domestic prosperity, and courted escalation. It creates a form of rage that makes deterrence and diplomacy more difficult.
The assertion that this fanaticism makes ground realities wholly inapplicable, however, goes too far. History repeatedly demonstrates that even the most ideologically driven regimes break when their physical instruments of power are shattered. Theology can prolong suffering and raise the bar for surrender, but it cannot conjure missiles, sustain economies, defend airspace, or maintain popular legitimacy indefinitely.
Imperial Japan’s divine-emperor cult and kamikaze ethos embodied fanatical militarism and disregard for life, yet the regime surrendered unconditionally once its navy, air force, and cities were destroyed. Nazi Germany’s thousand-year Reich myth fueled horrifying zeal, but the regime collapsed under overwhelming Allied superiority. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, infused with its own ideological fervor, could not withstand sustained coalition pressure.
Even within Iran’s own history, Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of the revolutionary eschatology, accepted a humiliating ceasefire in 1988 after eight years of devastating war with Iraq. Despite framing the conflict in near-apocalyptic terms and vowing to fight “to the last drop of blood,” the crushing realities of battlefield losses, economic ruin, and internal exhaustion forced pragmatism.
The pattern holds: eschatological rage can inspire desperate asymmetric responses and make negotiation painful. It explains why the regime acts as it does, but it does not repeal logistics, economics, or the basic requirements of governance. When a regime loses air superiority, naval power, proxy effectiveness, and the ability to protect its leadership or feed its population, belief alone rarely compensates.
Eschatology is not monolithic, even among sincere believers. Twelver tradition explicitly warns against reckless “hastening” of the Mahdi through speculation on timing or forcing prophetic signs. The date of the Hidden Imam’s final advent is unknown, and believers are urged to await deliverance (faraj) patiently and piously.”
When expected conditions fail to materialize, when the “righteous vanguard” suffers degradation rather than triumph, cognitive and theological dissonance emerges. Believers ask: If we are the chosen instrument, why are we being obliterated? Some interpret setbacks as evidence of an alternate divine will, perhaps Allah testing, delaying, or punishing the community for corruption, mismanagement, repression, or doctrinal deviation. The “prophetic indictment” narrative has deep roots in Shia history: failures can be reframed as proof that current leadership is unworthy of the Mahdi’s blessing.
These interpretations create fractures. Quietists clash with activists; pragmatists differ from hardliners. Elite cohesion frays when battlefield reality collides with apocalyptic expectation. Under sustained pressure, these internal theological fault lines, combined with material losses, can open pathways for collapse or reform from within.
Recent independent surveys reveal a striking picture of divergence. Among the general population, adherence to the regime’s activist Twelver Shia eschatology is receding amid broad secularization.
Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN) polls show:
Only about 26% of Iranians believed in the coming of the Imam Mahdi in the 2020 religion survey (far below 78% believe in God).
Support for the “principles of the Islamic revolution and the Supreme Leader” fell sharply, from around 18% in 2022 to just 11% in June 2024.
Roughly 70–80% say they would not vote for the Islamic Republic if given a free choice, withmajorities favoring separation of religion from the state. Opposition is highest among the young, educated, and urban.
This erosion reflects widespread disillusionment: many Iranians view the theocracy as a source of corruption, failure, and repression rather than divine preparation. Setbacks can fuel “prophetic indictment” thinking, the idea that setbacks signal divine punishment, further undermining cohesion.
At the same time, the regime’s core power base has hardened. Within the IRGC and Basij, Mahdist indoctrination has intensified. Ideological-political training now dominates recruit formation (often 40–50% or more of programs), while promotion increasingly rewards zeal and doctrinal loyalty over technical competence. Newer generations of commanders are more fervently committed to the apocalyptic “resistance” mission. The IRGC is explicitly framed as a tool “paving the way for the emergence of the Imam of the Age.”
This creates a classic “door that swings both ways”:
Positive Side for Regime Change: Societal secularization weakens the regime’s legitimacy and opens pathways for fractures, defections, or mass disillusionment when material losses clash with apocalyptic expectations.
Cautionary Side: The remaining true believers, concentrated in institutions controlling missiles, proxies, and repression, are often more radicalized. This hardened core may show higher risk tolerance and a preference for desperate asymmetric actions.
In short, eschatological rage is real and dangerous, but it is increasingly the ideology of a shrinking, insulated elite rather than a unifying national faith. The regime is not immune to pressure. Sustained, targeted degradation of its material capabilities is even more potent, accelerating the fractures and loss of will that history shows even fervent regimes eventually face.
Degraded capabilities, shifting alliances, and visible desperation threaten the growing disconnect between the regime’s ideological core and a secularizing population. Understanding Iran’s eschatological worldview is essential; it warns against expecting an easy off-ramp and demands preparation for possible final spasms of rage. But it should not lead to fatalism. Theological conviction has never proven immune to sustained, targeted pressure on the material foundations of power.
More, if regime collapse is inevitable, reducing the consequences of the final desperate acts of rage is imperative. Victory is costly, but it remains very much within reach.
Image created using AI.
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