Yousuf Nazar’s suggestion that the citizens of Pakistan submit to another decade of military rule will come across as a cruel joke to the millions of young people who are expecting a better future and are also struggling for it.

Military dictatorships raise hopes in the beginning, but quickly empower unresponsive and oppressive bureaucracies that work to entrench their own privilege and serve the interests of landed and business classes. As the people of Pakistan have lived through several long periods of direct military rule during which no serious effort was made to combat mass poverty and to put the country on the road to progress, there is no reason to believe that another spell of authoritarian rule will benefit the country.

In the existing political context, the implementation of Nazar’s suggestion, if that were possible, would only seek to exacerbate the crisis of legitimacy the government of Pakistan is presently coping with. Under direct military rule, the state will find itself faced with the task of suppressing all political parties and dissent, while it forces urban business groups and the agrarian elite to do things like paying taxes, that they have never done before. Quite simply, the proposal is quixotic, as it advocates for the creation of a dysfunctional “overdeveloped state.”

The colonial state set up by the British Raj, which Prof. Hamza Alavi described as “overdeveloped,” survived as long as it did because it was structurally designed to be an agency for suppression and domination of all political groups and social classes, and was not concerned with the provision of public goods and services to people. The postcolonial state in Pakistan cannot survive and function for long without a minimal degree of legitimacy, which is why, according to Alavi, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy that forms the core of its state apparatus seeks the partnership of political parties, as well as ideological backing of religious leaders, media, and intelligentsia.

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Alavi also points out that individual members of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, also share a commonality of interest, as well as connections with leading members of the landed and business classes, often going back to the colonial period. Given this reality, is it reasonable to assume that the bureaucratic-military oligarchy would have an interest in seriously questioning the privileges of agrarian and business interests for the sake of structural reform?

The dominance of the industrial elite of Karachi has reduced significantly at the cost of the Punjabi industrial class that emerged since the 1980s, and the state has also accommodated powerful business interests from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but this has not reduced the cohesiveness of the ruling elite as a whole.

Rosita Armytage conducted ethnographic research between 2013-2015 on strategic family alliances among members of Pakistan’s ruling class factions. She came to the conclusion that the owners of Pakistan’s major industrial and businesses interests, politicians, people serving in influential positions in transnational corporations, and senior members of the bureaucracy and military personnel have cultivated close connections and alliances with each other, and their ethnic diversity has not come in their way as they have accomplished this task.

Armytage also found that the degree of ruling-class integration found in Pakistan is “unprecedented” in South Asia. Since the 1970s, the composition and relative influence of factions of the ruling-class has altered significantly. For example, the dominance of the industrial elite of Karachi has reduced significantly at the cost of the Punjabi industrial class that emerged since the 1980s, and the state has also accommodated powerful business interests from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but this has not reduced the cohesiveness of the ruling elite as a whole. Members of the elite consciously strengthen inter-ruling class connections, even pursuing non-consanguineous marriages as a strategy to seal alliances of this nature.

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When Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998 and faced crippling sanctions, the political class could have sought to undertake structural reform in the economy as a requirement for national survival, but the option was not considered.

Given the cohesiveness of the inter-connections between the members of the military, bureaucracy, industrial, business, and agrarian factions of the ruling elite, it is inconceivable that any one of them would seriously seek to act contrary to each others’ core interests, no matter how important that may be to promote robust economic growth that would benefit the country as a whole.

When Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998 and faced crippling sanctions, the political class could have sought to undertake structural reform in the economy as a requirement for national survival, but the option was not considered. When General Musharraf toppled the government in 1999, and the country faced draconian sanctions and international political isolation, the option of structural reform was again rejected out of hand.

If history is any guide, it is evident that the military has no interest in the kind of changes Yousuf Nazar implores them to undertake.

It is also important to analyse the validity of Nazar’s thesis that authoritarian rule is necessary for the achievement of robust economic growth. He cites examples from the Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Vietnam as places where economic progress was achieved under authoritarian rule. What Nazar fails to do, however, is to point out and analyse the specific steps that each of these states took to make meaningful economic progress possible. Yes, in all the above-mentioned cases, strong states stood up to transnational capital and reactionary agrarian interests to undertake structural changes, pursued public investments and promoted research and development, but was that all there was to it?

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The substantive nature of a state’s approach to progress is determined by its formative political movements. China and Taiwan designed their development strategies to achieve the goals of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, national independence and “people’s livelihood,” that were proclaimed by revolutionary leader, Dr. SunYat-sen. Despite vicissitudes in their complicated history that ranged from alliance to civil war, and the requirements of the radically different social systems they adopted, China and Taiwan continue to revere Sun Yat-sen, and claim they remain faithful to his goals.

The first step that China and Taiwan took to achieve “people’s livelihood” was land reform. While China’s socialist revolution overthrew the landlord class, in Taiwan, the chastened Kuomintang decided that it would also not defend landlord privilege in the island and undertook “thorough” land reforms. As a result, poor and often illiterate cultivators of the soil eventually became independent farmers, with the ability to be consumers of commodities and taxpayers.

In South Korea, land reforms were done during the brief period when communists were in control during the Korean war and continued by the government of South Korea after the war ended. In Vietnam, the communist movement led by Ho Chi Minh that struggled for independence from French colonial rule, had aims similar to those of the Chinese revolutionaries, and instituted land reforms in North Vietnam soon after defeating France in 1954. By the time the US backed government in South Vietnam was defeated in 1975, the massive destruction of the countryside caused by the war had already changed the agricultural landscape in a way that ended large landholdings. After unification, the Vietnamese government attempted to collectivise agriculture in the South, but restored the farm organization system based on small land holdings when the effort failed.

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Pakistan cannot embark on the path of progress traversed by China, Taiwan, and South Korea if it skips land reforms, an essential step that ended mass poverty there.

Land redistribution ensured that the state was freed from the reactionary political influence of the agrarian landlord class that could oppose structural change. Today, the state in Pakistan, which has not had meaningful land reform, is still saddled with the enormous political influence of an agrarian elite that does not pay taxes, opposes structural change, and compels the actual tillers of the soil to live in poverty.

Pakistan cannot embark on the path of progress traversed by China, Taiwan, and South Korea if it skips land reforms, an essential step that ended mass poverty there. If we look at pockets of relative prosperity in India, such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Punjab, we find that all these states have had comprehensive land reforms.

These states have also seen a significant reduction in the rate of population growth, confirming the prediction of distinguished scholar Amartya Sen that this would happen when progress was accompanied with the provision of access to healthcare and education. There is no reason to believe that the high rate of population growth would begin to decline in Pakistan too, should it take determined measures to end mass poverty.

Besides implementing thorough land reform, the state bureaucracy in South Korea and Taiwan also planned and meticulously implemented a strategy of industrial development that included a hands-on approach to dealing with transnational and local capital, and supervision of research and development of technology and its transfer to specific enterprises. This was followed up by the protection of the domestic market from foreign competition.

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Peter Evans notes that partnerships between transnational capital, the state and local capital in South Korea and Taiwan were distinct from those in Latin America in that the former were dominated by the state, instead of transnational capital. This meant that economic development in these societies was vastly more inclusive and equitable than was the case in Latin America.

Land reform, and a creative and consistent state role in the planning and execution of an industrial policy are the key steps that Pakistan too will need to implement to achieve progress. There is no reason why a democratic dispensation could not accomplish these tasks.

QOSHE - Land Reform And Industrial Strategy: The Route Pakistan Rejected - Tariq Ahsan
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Land Reform And Industrial Strategy: The Route Pakistan Rejected

12 0
17.04.2024

Yousuf Nazar’s suggestion that the citizens of Pakistan submit to another decade of military rule will come across as a cruel joke to the millions of young people who are expecting a better future and are also struggling for it.

Military dictatorships raise hopes in the beginning, but quickly empower unresponsive and oppressive bureaucracies that work to entrench their own privilege and serve the interests of landed and business classes. As the people of Pakistan have lived through several long periods of direct military rule during which no serious effort was made to combat mass poverty and to put the country on the road to progress, there is no reason to believe that another spell of authoritarian rule will benefit the country.

In the existing political context, the implementation of Nazar’s suggestion, if that were possible, would only seek to exacerbate the crisis of legitimacy the government of Pakistan is presently coping with. Under direct military rule, the state will find itself faced with the task of suppressing all political parties and dissent, while it forces urban business groups and the agrarian elite to do things like paying taxes, that they have never done before. Quite simply, the proposal is quixotic, as it advocates for the creation of a dysfunctional “overdeveloped state.”

The colonial state set up by the British Raj, which Prof. Hamza Alavi described as “overdeveloped,” survived as long as it did because it was structurally designed to be an agency for suppression and domination of all political groups and social classes, and was not concerned with the provision of public goods and services to people. The postcolonial state in Pakistan cannot survive and function for long without a minimal degree of legitimacy, which is why, according to Alavi, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy that forms the core of its state apparatus seeks the partnership of political parties, as well as ideological backing of religious leaders, media, and intelligentsia.

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Alavi also points out that individual members of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, also share a commonality of interest, as well as connections with leading members of the landed and business classes, often going back to the colonial period. Given this reality, is it reasonable to assume that the bureaucratic-military oligarchy would have an interest in seriously questioning the privileges of agrarian and business interests for the sake of structural reform?

The dominance of the industrial elite of Karachi has reduced significantly at the cost of the Punjabi industrial class that emerged since the........

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