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The war in Ukraine has been grinding on for 22 months now, with tens of thousands of deaths on both sides. In all that time, with all that loss, the battle lines have barely budged. But last weekend, Russia tried to take a sledgehammer to that stalemate. I asked Slate’s Fred Kaplan what happened.

“Russia usually launches a few rockets at a time, or maybe a dozen is a lot. They launched something like 180 rockets all at once,” he said. “If somebody had guessed the day before whether Russia even had that many missiles ready to go, they might have doubted it.”

Dozens were reportedly killed in this attack. Afterward, Ukraine fired its own rockets into Russian territory as retaliation. They also killed civilians. It seemed to me like a new kind of escalation after two years of day-to-day battle on the ground. One security expert said that it wasn’t just the sheer number of missiles Russia fired that surprised them, it was the way they seemed to elude any defense, with some flying in circles before looping around to their targets.

“It was coordinated across the entire stretch of the Russia–Ukraine border. In other words, it indicates that Russia still has some kind of integrated command system,” Kaplan said. “We’re beginning to realize that Russia has a lot more reserves than anybody thought, not just in weapons, but in manpower. It is a military that has begun to learn some lessons of its failures in the past and has made adjustments, which means they could last longer than had been calculated.”

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As Russia’s Ukraine war enters a new phase, we spoke to Kaplan on a recent episode of What Next about whether the West will come up with the cash to hold Putin off. Our conversation has been condensed and edited for clarity.

Mary Harris: What would you say the state of play in Ukraine is right now?

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Fred Kaplan: The state of play is still a stalemate, but at more intense and more highly destructive levels.

What do you mean by that?

Well, if you’re looking at how much territory has been captured, that has been almost unchanged for the last nine months, and it continues to be essentially unchanged. Ukraine might take over a town, or Russia might take over a town, but it’s kind of a net zero. On the other hand, Ukraine has started to step out of its former limits. It used to hold back on attacking targets inside Russia. Now, there are actual rocket attacks, like the attack on Belgorod—this was clearly stuff fired from Ukraine.

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This attack on Belgorod, this happened right after the blitz on Ukraine.

It was in response. In other words, it was: “OK, we are going to show you that we still know how to play asymmetrical warfare. You fire 150 missiles at cities. Well, we go after something in Russia.” This is stepping up the battle. This is: “You’re not respecting our borders. We’re not respecting yours anymore either.”

Does that concern you? Because you mentioned how when you’re attacking inside Russia, it becomes something potentially bigger, potentially drawing in more combatants.

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These red lines are subtle to the point of questioning whether they’re meaningful. The U.S. has always said that U.S. weapons will not be used for that purpose, which was one reason why, for quite a long time, President Biden was reluctant to ship long-range missiles to Ukraine. They didn’t want to give them a missile from which they could hit Russian targets. Well, he let up on that idea, but he still said, “Don’t use this to attack targets in Russia.” Then it became, “Well, if you want to use your own weapons or other countries’ weapons to attack targets in Russia, that’s OK. Just don’t use ours.”

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Does that mean really that if, say, they used one of our weapons to attack targets in Russia, that Putin would start attacking targets inside NATO? I don’t think so. I think a lot of these red lines, which people feared at the beginning of the war, have dissolved or turned very pink anyway. And it could be that Putin is realizing that he can just hang on.

So if I’m hearing you right, what you’re saying is that this new phase of the war is this realization that Russia has a lot more people and maybe a little more coordination and maybe a few more missiles than we thought, which is alarming. But also that Ukraine is stepping up its guerrilla tactics a little bit, tactics inside Russia. And that’s interesting to me because those approaches, they don’t seem symmetrically matched. And I wonder what you think that means about what happens now.

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In any war that has settled into a stalemate, each side is looking for advantages, and if there are no advantages in the head-to-head conflict, then you look for asymmetrical advantages. For Ukraine, it’s loosening some of the rules of engagement. With Russia, it’s relying on a reserve of manpower or missiles that is much larger than had been thought.

We really haven’t seen since World War I the use of people, of new recruits, as cannon fodder to the degree that we’ve seen with Putin. Three hundred fifty thousand soldiers lost in a war that’s not quite two years old—and most of those just in the last six months. They go through almost no training. They’re just rushed into the lines to soak up Ukrainian ammunition, whose supply is being depleted. That’s what cannon fodder means. It’s just soaking up the cannon fire of the other side.

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In 10 years of the Afghan war, the Soviet Union lost, I think, 15,000 soldiers. And that helped lead to the crumbling of the Soviet regime. To lose 350,000 people in not quite two years is just extraordinary. There’s been almost nothing like it ever.

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You’ve been saying for a while that this war in Ukraine is at a stalemate. But I wonder how you reacted when you saw that back in November, the Ukrainian army commander in chief said in an interview with the Economist that the war had settled into a stalemate. It seems to me to be one thing when you, Fred Kaplan, say it and another when the Army’s commander says it.

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It was rather impolitic for him to say, and President Zelensky was very upset about it. He denied it. He then had his army go attack a Russian ship near Crimea. And it was then that he rushed to make a tour of the West to say, “Look, we’re still doing well, but we need your weapons.” Still, it was an alarming thing for the chief of staff of the Army to say.

With Russia content to throw seemingly limitless numbers of troops into battle, Ukraine says it needs aid to fight back. Before the holidays, President Zelensky came to Washington, hat in hand, hoping to secure the passage of a bill that would send $60 billion of aid his way, a renewal of full support. He had to settle for a measly $250 million weapons package.

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The Department of Defense says that’s the end of it, unless Congress gets its act together. But House Republicans say they won’t pass anything bigger without strict border regulations attached. And Senate Democrats say that’s a nonstarter.

Biden is in kind of a spot. If he gives in to the Republicans on every part of this bill, it might not get passed in the Senate. And yet the Republicans are, at least for the moment, demanding that he give in on everything. There were some negotiations before the holiday recess, but they didn’t go anywhere. So we’ll see what happens.

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There are a lot of Republicans who, if you just took away 2024 politics and everything else, are very much in favor of continuing to aid Ukraine. If it was just a one-time bill at 2 in the morning with no media coverage, that bill would win.

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But we should say the Republican approach here, it’s tracking with U.S. public opinion in general, like Gallup polling from November shows 41 percent of Americans think we’re doing too much to help Ukraine. Last June, that number was 29 percent. Why do you think Americans are cooling here?

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It’s still a majority in favor of aiding Ukraine. It is not as large a majority as before, that’s true. Part of it is that at the beginning of this war, Ukraine performed so well and Russia performed so poorly—there were people saying that next week Ukrainian troops are going to be on the Russian border. They’re going to be storming the Kremlin. Some of the claims were wild. As Ukraine went back on the offensive and Russia went to the defensive, things changed. If somebody is looking at what’s going on and looking at these remarks about stalemate, and they think, Oh, Jesus, is this going to go on for the next 10 years?, or Is Biden and any future president going to keep coming back for another 60 billion, another 60 billion every three months, and this is going to go on for the rest of my life? Let’s bring this to an end.

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Congress is back in session on Monday, and they’re going to come back to this issue, I’m sure. What’s happening in the meantime in Ukraine? What’s going to happen without the money going out? Has time already run out here?

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I think they’re fine for the next few months. But yeah, beyond that, if the U.S. doesn’t renew its package, they’re going to be in serious trouble. They’re going to have a severe shortage of ammunition, of missiles, of air defense missiles, which is a big thing. Probably by the spring, they’re going to be in deep trouble.

It feels like however these negotiations play out over the next few weeks over Ukraine aid, Republicans have successfully shifted the Overton window when it comes to Ukraine. Even President Biden seems to be changing the way he talks about the war. In December, when Zelensky was visiting, Biden gave a press conference, and he said that the U.S. is going to support Ukraine, but really that Ukraine has had an enormous victory already. Putin has failed. Which seems to be, like, “We’re coming to our conclusion here,” versus, like, “We’re in the fight, let’s do it.”

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Some of the rhetoric has changed from “as long as it takes” to “as long as we can.” And then there has been some background source news stories that talk about what the strategy is going to be to help Ukraine continue to stave off any additional Russian advances, which is very different from helping Ukraine rack up another successful counteroffensive.

Feels a little bit like Ukraine’s in hospice care.

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What it will take to enable Ukraine to push the Russians out of Ukraine entirely by force is way beyond what anybody is going to give them. That’s just not going to happen. And so then you say, “Well, what can we do?” We can keep Russia from taking over any more territory in Ukraine. And that becomes a very different thing.

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And you’ve pointed out the fact that Putin’s got every reason to hold tight here, because if Trump wins the 2024 election, he might be able to not give in on anything.

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That’s right. There have been several former aides to Trump who said that had he won the election in 2020, he was going to pull out of NATO. And I don’t see anything that Trump has said lately that calls that into question for what he’ll do in 2024. And Ukraine isn’t even part of NATO. Trump respects Putin. Trump wants to restore relations with Russia. It is widely viewed and feared all throughout Europe that if Trump gets back in, the U.S. alliances with Europe in general are basically severed.

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So if you’re Antony Blinken, secretary of state, are you like, “Oh, gosh, I’ve got like six to nine months to hammer out what’s happening in Ukraine”?

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But what really needs to happen—unless you just want to give up—is that the aid has to be restored, that there has to be a deal between the White House and Congress. Otherwise it could collapse. And here’s the thing: I’m usually not the kind of guy who talks in these sorts of terms. I don’t generally believe in domino theories and things like that. But if it is shown that after all this effort and trouble and time and money, the U.S. just kind of caves because it’s getting too hard, and Putin wins in a meaningful way, this sends a message to China about what they might be able to get away with in Taiwan.

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It also sends the same message to our allies in Asia, especially Japan and South Korea, which might say, “Jesus, we can’t really rely on the United States. We’d better build our own nuclear arsenal as a deterrent,” which will then provoke a real nuclear arms race with China. And North Korea might also build more nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, it might tell foes and friends that the U.S. deterrent really isn’t as severe or as certain as some of the leaders of the U.S. say. It’s going to make the world, which is already a fairly anarchic place, much, much more freewheeling and anarchic and not in our favor at all.

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View Transcript

You’re saying the U.S. is showing its backside a little bit?

There used to be this phrase “politics stops at the water’s edge.”

What does that mean?

Well, it means that we’re united on foreign policy. That all the squabbles between parties, at the water’s edge—once you get involved in foreign relations—that that all ends, that the United States is a solidly united country. That’s never really been true, but it’s been truer than it is now. Politics don’t stop at the water’s edge at all. And that situation can be exploited quite easily.

So this Ukraine funding mess, it’s really about way more than Ukraine.

Ukraine is about way more than Ukraine at this point and has been for quite a while.

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What Happens if We Let Ukraine Lose?

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05.01.2024

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The war in Ukraine has been grinding on for 22 months now, with tens of thousands of deaths on both sides. In all that time, with all that loss, the battle lines have barely budged. But last weekend, Russia tried to take a sledgehammer to that stalemate. I asked Slate’s Fred Kaplan what happened.

“Russia usually launches a few rockets at a time, or maybe a dozen is a lot. They launched something like 180 rockets all at once,” he said. “If somebody had guessed the day before whether Russia even had that many missiles ready to go, they might have doubted it.”

Dozens were reportedly killed in this attack. Afterward, Ukraine fired its own rockets into Russian territory as retaliation. They also killed civilians. It seemed to me like a new kind of escalation after two years of day-to-day battle on the ground. One security expert said that it wasn’t just the sheer number of missiles Russia fired that surprised them, it was the way they seemed to elude any defense, with some flying in circles before looping around to their targets.

“It was coordinated across the entire stretch of the Russia–Ukraine border. In other words, it indicates that Russia still has some kind of integrated command system,” Kaplan said. “We’re beginning to realize that Russia has a lot more reserves than anybody thought, not just in weapons, but in manpower. It is a military that has begun to learn some lessons of its failures in the past and has made adjustments, which means they could last longer than had been calculated.”

Advertisement

As Russia’s Ukraine war enters a new phase, we spoke to Kaplan on a recent episode of What Next about whether the West will come up with the cash to hold Putin off. Our conversation has been condensed and edited for clarity.

Mary Harris: What would you say the state of play in Ukraine is right now?

Advertisement

Advertisement

Advertisement

Fred Kaplan: The state of play is still a stalemate, but at more intense and more highly destructive levels.

What do you mean by that?

Well, if you’re looking at how much territory has been captured, that has been almost unchanged for the last nine months, and it continues to be essentially unchanged. Ukraine might take over a town, or Russia might take over a town, but it’s kind of a net zero. On the other hand, Ukraine has started to step out of its former limits. It used to hold back on attacking targets inside Russia. Now, there are actual rocket attacks, like the attack on Belgorod—this was clearly stuff fired from Ukraine.

Advertisement

This attack on Belgorod, this happened right after the blitz on Ukraine.

It was in response. In other words, it was: “OK, we are going to show you that we still know how to play asymmetrical warfare. You fire 150 missiles at cities. Well, we go after something in Russia.” This is stepping up the battle. This is: “You’re not respecting our borders. We’re not respecting yours anymore either.”

Does that concern you? Because you mentioned how when you’re attacking inside Russia, it becomes something potentially bigger, potentially drawing in more combatants.

Advertisement

These red lines are subtle to the point of questioning whether they’re meaningful. The U.S. has always said that U.S. weapons will not be used for that purpose, which was one reason why, for quite a long time, President Biden was reluctant to ship long-range missiles to Ukraine. They didn’t want to give them a missile from which they could hit Russian targets. Well, he let up on........

© Slate


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