Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
GENERAL Bipin Rawat reconfirmation about the existence and validity of the’ Cold Start Doctrine’ verifies Pakistan’s serious concerns about India’s armed forces modernization. Simultaneously, the admittance by General Bipin falsify pro-India American intellectuals claim that India was not working for the institutionalisation of the Cold Start Doctrine. Indeed, the continuation of the Cold Start Doctrine justifies Pakistan’s development of battlefield nuclear weapons or tactical nuclear weapons.
General Bipin Rawat, India’s new Chief of Army Staff, in an interview to India Today acknowledges India’s military doctrine, ie “Cold Start Doctrine.” He stated: “Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional military operations.”( SandeepUnnithan, “We will cross again,” India Today, January 4, 2017). The admittance about the existence of Cold Start Doctrine would not be having any impact on the making of Pakistan’s defence strategy. It is because; Pakistan’s maker of modern defence strategy has not ignored the Indian armed forces modernization since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Moreover, they have not taken seriously the American experts on South Asia propaganda about the non-existence of Cold Start Doctrine. Nevertheless, the General Bipin announcement about the Cold Start Doctrine reality would be having political and diplomatic consequences.
Since the failure of Operation Parakram in 2002, the New Delhi has been modernizing its ham-fisted armed forces to establish its hegemony in South Asia. On April 28, 2004, the then Indian Chief of Army Staff, General Nirmal Chander Vij unveiled Cold Start doctrine during the Army Commanders Conference. The Cold Start Doctrine marked a break from the fundamentally defensive orientation that the Indian military had employed since independence in 1947. According to the published sources, Cold start doctrine visualized a “tri-service doctrine”, which necessitates restructuring of the Indian Army and reorganizing the Indian Army’s offensive power away from the three large strike corps into eight smaller division-sized “integrated battle groups” (IBGs) that combine mechanized infantry, artillery, and armor.
The eight battle groups would be prepared to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan along different axes of advance to destroy its defensive and offensive Corps. The ground operations of the IBGs require integration with close air support from the Indian Air Force and naval aviation assets to provide highly mobile fire support. In addition, the holding corps would be redesigned as “pivot corps” and would be bolstered by additional armor and artillery. This would allow them to concurrently man defensive positions and undertake limited offensive operations as necessary. The primary objective of the Cold Start Doctrine is to enhance the speed of both deployment and operations to multiply Indian Army’s war fighting capability against Pakistan. Precisely, the Cold Start Doctrine prepare Indian armed forces to ‘conduct quick, punishing strikes into Pakistan, hopefully without crossing Pakistan’s fuzzy redlines for a nuclear response. The vague redlines include cutting off a major supply route, seizing.....