1977 marked a point of departure in the politics of both India and Israel, two multi-party parliamentary democracies. In March 1977, a non-Congress government was formed in India for the first time. The incoming Janata Party was a coalescence, rather than a coalition, of several political parties with dissimilar ideologies. There was the Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh, the Socialists, the Jat-dominated Bharatiya Lok Dal, and even renegade Congressmen. Prime Minister Morarji Desai (81), was himself a self-assured Congressman, widely travelled but rigid in his opinions. Once perceived as an heir to Jawaharlal Nehru, but later marginalised by his daughter Indira Gandhi, Desai was incarcerated during the Emergency.

The ‘Janata Experiment’ (1977-79) was short-lived and crushed under the weight of its internal contradictions. Yet, it brought two signal Constitution amendments and reviewed certain aspects of government policy to restore a sense of proportionality. Of particular interest was the sphere of foreign policy, as the External Affair portfolio was held by a Jana Sangh man viz. Atal Bihari Vajpayee. US President Jimmy Carter paid a visit to India (January 1-3, 1978). Not until March 2000 did another US President (viz. Bill Clinton) visit India, interestingly when Vajpayee became the Prime Minister.

Israel hoped to benefit from this changeover at the Centre. Though India had recognised Israel (estd.1948) in 1950, diplomatic ties were kept low-profile from the Indian side. Whereas the Zionist country was allowed to maintain only a Consulate in Bombay (now Mumbai), India had no diplomatic presence in Israel whatsoever. This, in hindsight, was meant to please the Arab nations. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) in its various foreign policy resolutions (e.g. June 30, 1967; Shimla) had advocated India’s full diplomatic relationship with Israel. The BJS’ Bombay resolution (April 26, 1969) declared that a “touch-me-not” attitude towards Israel was neither rational nor national. Rather, it was a partisan policy with communal overtones that must be changed and steps taken to normalise relations with Israel.

1977 marked a turning point in the history of Israel as well. On June 21, 1977, Menachem Begin, the founder of the Likud Party, became the Prime Minister. The ascent of Likud marked the eclipse of the Mapai (Labour) Party, which had dominated Israel during the first three decades of its existence. However, in statecraft, experience enjoys a certain advantage over ideology. In India, Jayaprakash Narayan, having unseated Indira Gandhi’s regime, still chose an arch-Congressman viz. Morarji Desai, to lead the Janata Party government. In Israel, Prime Minister Begin, having defeated the Mapai, chose to induct Moshe Dayan as his Foreign Minister, elected to Knesset on the Mapai List (Israel follows a proportional representation system for elections to Knesset where people vote for the parties rather than candidates).

Moshe Dayan, the iconic Israeli General, had served as the Defence Minister between 1967 and 1974, in the Mapai governments under Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir. His reputation, sky high after the Six Day War (1967), plummeted sharply after the Yom Kippur War (1973), where Israel secured a pyrrhic victory. Between May 1974 and June 1977, he retired from politics to devote time to archaeology, whose masterly product was his book ‘Living with the Bible’ (1978). Despite its evangelical-sounding title, the book was actually about archaeology of the Holy Land, and reinterpreting the stories of the Old Testament in a new light.

Begin chose Moshe Dayan as his Foreign Minister, as Dayan’s biographer Mordechai Bar-on says, on account of the latter’s renown among international statesmen, his reputation among Jewish diaspora as well as his esteem among Arab leaders (Moshe Dayan: Israel’s Controversial Hero, P.193). In his new role, Dayan was instrumental in forging lasting peace with Egypt, in a US-mediated deal at Washington D.C. on March 26, 1979, following a long and tortuous negotiation. Soon after taking office on June 23, 1977, Dayan undertook several secret visits to India, Persia (now Iran), and Morocco to prepare the ground for a peace deal. He undertook these visits incognito, which would have made Mossad operatives envious of him. Dayan gives the account of those visits in his memoirs dealing with the 1977-79 period Breakthrough: A Personal Account of Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (Alfred Knopf, New York, 1981). However, even before the book hit the stands, and was soon republished in India by Vikas Publishing House Ltd, the matter had been leaked to the press. His visit to New Delhi incognito created a furore after the Janata Party government fell.

To quote L.K. Advani (1980), the matter was first reported in a New York paper in early 1979, followed by an Israeli newspaper; and Indira Gandhi raised the matter on the eve of the 1980 elections. The now-defunct Sunday (an Ananda Bazar Patrika publication) carried a report by M.J. Akbar (“The Full Story of Moshe Dayan’s Secret Trip to India”) in its April 27, 1980 issue. The matter rocked the Rajya Sabha during the Question Hour on June 13, 1980 (vide Oral Question – Moshe Dayan’s visit to India).

This columnist, who could not lay his hand on Dayan’s book Breakthrough, found the excerpts in archival issues of Sunday magazine (June 28 and July 5, 1981) giving a complete account of Dayan’s secret visits to New Delhi, Tehran, London, Fez and Rabat. As per the first-person account of Moshe Dayan, he visited India incognito on August 14, 1977, and flew out on the morrow. He met Prime Minister Morarji Desai and External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee together at a poorly furnished ‘government house’ on the evening of August 14. This visit was approved by Desai and was arranged through a couple of common friends, an Israeli and an Indian, who had accidentally met while undergoing therapy at a weight management centre in London.

As per Dayan’s account, he arrived in India from Tel Aviv by an Alitalia (Italian Airlines) flight to Bombay (now Mumbai) on August 14, 1977. While Prime Minister Begin and the Israeli cabinet approved of this visit, it was naturally kept secret from the press. He gave no details of his disguise, or whether he used a fake passport (gaps which M.J. Akbar had liberally filled with common sense or imagination in the April 27, 1980 report). There was no specific reason for Dayan to suppress such details since he had generously given those out in case of his return flight to Tel Aviv and visit to Morocco in the guise of ‘Beatnik’.

From Bombay, Dayan was brought to New Delhi secretly by a Tupolev 114 jet sent by Morarji Desai. The flight was full of secret servicemen (whether RAW or IB he had no idea). Dayan met Morarji Desai at around 7.30 PM at an ill-furnished ‘government house’ where they were joined by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. It seems probable that the same was arranged only for that meeting. Dayan presented Desai with his “book” (apparently Story of My Life) published recently. Desai, known for his parsimonious habits, wanted to know its price, even before opening the book. When Dayan remarked “10 dollars”, Desai exclaimed it was “expensive”!

Dayan admittedly had two objectives for visiting New Delhi –a) to explain Israel’s views on the upcoming Geneva Peace Conference in October 1977 and b) to seek an improvement of diplomatic ties between India and Israel. However, to his surprise, Desai denied the visitor any opportunity to place his preliminary remarks on the subject. Rather he asked Dayan if the latter knew the reason for being invited to New Delhi. However, here also, Desai himself gave the reply before Dayan could even react. The reason, according to Desai, was that India was interested in the establishment of peace in the West Asian region. Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt, had already met Desai and explained to him the situation. So there was, according to Desai, no need for Dayan to do it again for him (as though Egyptian and Israeli versions would match).

The Jews had suffered at the hands of the Nazis, said Desai, and thus they should not subject Arabs to the same kind of treatment. The occupation of territories must end, and refugees should be resettled. Desai informed Dayan that he had categorically told Sadat that the clock could not be turned back to disestablish Israel (something Late Gamal Abel Nasser had tried for until 1967), and Yasser Arafat could not be allowed to return to Israel as he pursued the same disestablishment agenda. However, a Palestinian state could be established in the occupied territories that Israel would evacuate.

On diplomatic ties with Israel, Desai regretted they could not be upgraded even to the extent of allowing another Consulate in New Delhi. He acknowledged that Nehru erred in not establishing full diplomatic ties with the Jewish state. However, any positive movement on Desai’s part would be opposed in India, including by its 700 million Muslim population. Dayan found that Desai had arrived at final conclusions on the subject, even without giving him an opportunity to speak.

When Dayan finally got his opportunity, only as a matter of courtesy, he opposed the two-state solution. He said that the solution was to absorb the Arabs (of Palestine) in lands where they lived at present, like Israel had absorbed and settled 850,000 Jews who had come to Israel from various Arab countries. On India’s desire to play a peacemaker in West Asia, Dayan said it was impractical as long as India did not ensure equality of relations. Why would Israel listen to India when its diplomatic relationships in the region were confined to Arab nations? “Now”, Dayan observes, “when his help was needed on behalf of peace, he could do nothing, since he had no diplomatic relationship with Israel; and once peace was attained, and India were to establish such relations, its help would no longer be necessary”.

The meeting achieved precious little as far as India-Israel relationships went, though the atmosphere was cordial. Desai stated that Vajpayee as External Affairs Minister could meet Dayan when both of them are in the United States or Europe for any conference. Sending Vajpayee to Israel, however, was ruled out. Dayan was impressed by Desai’s excellent English, and physical fitness at 82 years, though not by his intellectual integrity. Desai’s moralising tone, reminiscent of Nehru, perturbed Dayan the most. While seeing him off to the car, Desai expressed hope that they would meet again soon. That, however, never came about.

Dayan had spent the 30th anniversary of India’s independence in New Delhi in his ‘hideout’ (a guest house). A stealthy sightseeing tour of New Delhi did not appeal to him. He left New Delhi by prime minister’s plane after the dusk fell, and from Bombay, he took a commercial liner to Tel Aviv. This time, despite his dark glass and large straw hat, he faced an eerie moment as a fellow traveller recognised him and asked for an autograph. Angry at his own inadequate disguise, he still scolded the passenger away.

On March 26, 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty at Washington D.C., following the Camp David Accords signed the previous September. Moshe Dayan’s “disguised diplomacy” (travelling to Morocco incognito) played a vital role in preparing Egypt for peace. On July 28, 1979, Morarji Desai resigned as the Prime Minister of India after holding the post for a little more than two years. On October 16, 1981, Moshe Dayan, having battled health issues for two years, passed away.

Thus ended a chapter whereby New Delhi squandered away an opportunity to normalise relations with Tel Aviv. India’s fanciful idea of “playing a role in West Asia peace”, where nobody ever offered it a role, appears strange in hindsight. However, as we will see in the third and last part, that curious idea was not officially dead even in 1992 when India finally normalised diplomatic relations with Israel. India still officially claimed that establishing diplomatic ties with Israel was actually meant to achieve peace in West Asia (rather than securing India’s national interests). Facts are stranger than fiction indeed.

The writer is author of the book “The Microphone Men: How Orators Created a Modern India” (2019) and an independent researcher based in New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.

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Opinion | When Moshe Dayan Visited India Secretly

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08.11.2023

1977 marked a point of departure in the politics of both India and Israel, two multi-party parliamentary democracies. In March 1977, a non-Congress government was formed in India for the first time. The incoming Janata Party was a coalescence, rather than a coalition, of several political parties with dissimilar ideologies. There was the Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh, the Socialists, the Jat-dominated Bharatiya Lok Dal, and even renegade Congressmen. Prime Minister Morarji Desai (81), was himself a self-assured Congressman, widely travelled but rigid in his opinions. Once perceived as an heir to Jawaharlal Nehru, but later marginalised by his daughter Indira Gandhi, Desai was incarcerated during the Emergency.

The ‘Janata Experiment’ (1977-79) was short-lived and crushed under the weight of its internal contradictions. Yet, it brought two signal Constitution amendments and reviewed certain aspects of government policy to restore a sense of proportionality. Of particular interest was the sphere of foreign policy, as the External Affair portfolio was held by a Jana Sangh man viz. Atal Bihari Vajpayee. US President Jimmy Carter paid a visit to India (January 1-3, 1978). Not until March 2000 did another US President (viz. Bill Clinton) visit India, interestingly when Vajpayee became the Prime Minister.

Israel hoped to benefit from this changeover at the Centre. Though India had recognised Israel (estd.1948) in 1950, diplomatic ties were kept low-profile from the Indian side. Whereas the Zionist country was allowed to maintain only a Consulate in Bombay (now Mumbai), India had no diplomatic presence in Israel whatsoever. This, in hindsight, was meant to please the Arab nations. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) in its various foreign policy resolutions (e.g. June 30, 1967; Shimla) had advocated India’s full diplomatic relationship with Israel. The BJS’ Bombay resolution (April 26, 1969) declared that a “touch-me-not” attitude towards Israel was neither rational nor national. Rather, it was a partisan policy with communal overtones that must be changed and steps taken to normalise relations with Israel.

1977 marked a turning point in the history of Israel as well. On June 21, 1977, Menachem Begin, the founder of the Likud Party, became the Prime Minister. The ascent of Likud marked the eclipse of the Mapai (Labour) Party, which had dominated Israel during the first three decades of its existence. However, in statecraft, experience enjoys a certain advantage over ideology. In India, Jayaprakash Narayan, having unseated Indira Gandhi’s regime, still chose an arch-Congressman viz. Morarji Desai, to lead the Janata Party government. In Israel, Prime Minister Begin, having defeated the Mapai, chose to induct Moshe Dayan as his Foreign Minister, elected to Knesset on the Mapai List (Israel follows a proportional representation system for elections to Knesset where people vote for the parties rather than candidates).

Moshe Dayan, the iconic Israeli General, had served as the Defence Minister between 1967 and 1974, in the Mapai governments under Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir. His reputation, sky high after the Six Day War........

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