A central international political feature of the post-Cold War epoch is the evolving contest between two sets of competitors. One is a loose, though formidable, alliance between the nationalist People’s Republic of China (PRC) and a Russian state controlled by Soviet-era apparatchiks. These authoritarian powers confront a group of comparatively ‘like-minded’ states and societies which, notwithstanding diverse challenges to its existence, persists as the ‘West’ (Cf. Hellmann et al. 2014). This article contends that while Russia, under its current regime, presents a serious military and economic test, the West has sufficient material capacities to cope. More critical are intangibles of political will and character, along with the functional competence of cohesion. Across this spectrum of attributes, countries of the greater Baltic Sea region (Henningsen 2011; Westgaard 2023) demonstrate individual credentials and commitment. All ‘Norden’ (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland) has joined the hyper-vigilant Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in NATO. Germany, the Kremlin’s chief external target of psychological and cyber warfare, shifted from a posture that for decades exhibited traces of wishful thinking and even appeasement.

The article addresses different components of its topic in five sections. First, it outlines the ethos and internal discontents of Western liberal democracy. Second, it describes the motives and methods of Russia’s rulers. The third section considers Ukraine, the blazing epicentre of the contest. The fourth assesses the Baltic region. The fifth reviews Germany. The article then presents some remarks on how International Relations theory might appraise the topic.

Liberal Democracy and its Discontents

The contemporary West is partly defined by the political philosophy and system of liberal democracy. Its structures and institutions include a separation of powers, multiple parties, free and fair elections, the rule of law, and civil freedoms (V-Dem 2023). Copious evidence can be assembled to demonstrate the ideal type’s deficiencies (Cf. Klein 2016). Its scope for recurring crises is expanded by the ‘information age’ and the economic upheavals, cyber criminals, propagandists, terrorists, and other extremists it enables or exacerbates. A full list and analysis of liberal democracy’s flaws, or the fragmentation and polarisation occurring in states with variants of that system, is not the purpose of this article. Despite the defects, policy failures, and controversies, for most people who reside in one, liberal democracy is preferable to theocracies, juntas, and other authoritarian regimes of nominally ‘left’ or ‘right’. A cogent empirical indicator of relative desirability is the millions voting with their feet (WEF 2017; IOM 2021).

A paradoxical element in this type of polity is the freedom of opinion and critique that differentiates them from autocracies and simultaneously permits expression by sympathisers, apologists, and even devotees of such regimes (Cf. V-Dem 2023: 37). Some discontent in the West transmutes into empathy or overt advocacy for Russia, manifesting in organized parties to which its regime offers ‘trans-ideological’ appeal and funding (Braghiroli and Makarychev 2016). The initial zenith of these parties has passed though they may rise again. At a social level, supporters include: (i) persons disillusioned, in recent years, with western institutions, processes, and culture. Issues of specific individual importance may be added to a general dissatisfaction; (ii) persons who ideologically reject the state and society in which they reside. They defend certain authoritarian regimes whose rhetoric and image appeals. Some believe a narrative about Vladimir Putin being a ‘conservative’. Others positively associate him with Soviet values and mythology; (iii) persons who see themselves as ‘realists’ or ‘rational’ and oppose involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war on that basis. Some identify with and condone the Russian leadership’s behaviour, stretching conceptions of objectivity; (iv) others feel an affinity with Russia, regardless of its political structure or actions. These types inhabit societies of the alliance that opposes Russian belligerence and are targets of Kremlin propaganda (Makarychev 2021; Hoffeler 2022; Garner 2024).

Russia’s ruling clique: motives and modus operandi

The main source of problems between Russia and the West is not purported threats to Russian sovereignty, NATO enlargement, an alleged Nazi takeover of Ukraine, and so on. It is Russia’s political culture, or lack of it. A kleptocratic clique rules the country as a fiefdom (Ålsund 2019). It fears ‘democracy promotion’ because that implies the end of one-party states and the removal of autocrats. After acceding to the Presidency, opportunist Putin operated a compact with the (satirically titled) Liberal Democratic Party and the Communists, ostensibly more extreme than his vehicles. The President is styled as resolute and above politics while representatives of legal pretend parties, television provocateurs, and other stooges (Kiselev, Medvedev, Rogozin, Dugin, Karaganov) maintain an attack on Russia’s supposed enemies (Sykes 2023; Stoner 2023; Wood S. 2023a).

The clique tries to partly camouflage its interests (survival, power, wealth) behind assertions and prescriptions about international law and order. A ‘Charter’ liberalism (Clunan 2018), emphasising sovereignty and the privileged role of UN Security Council members, is ‘pluralist’, meaning it notionally tolerates all domestic political systems, and thus is consonant with Moscow’s preferences. A ‘humanist’ version of liberalism that could in some circumstances transcend state sovereignty is denounced. Yet Russia transgressed the sovereignty principle by annexing Crimea, interfering in Ukrainian territory (Allison 2017), and then invading and attempting to occupy most of the country.

Strategic calculation, duplicity, and politicised emotion co-exist for people able to preserve power in the Russian state. Three decades after the Soviet........

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